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Painting presents an almost infinite range of possibilities to convey meaning 
through the versatility and potential of the medium. It is to this potential for 
mimicking and representing the real world that I wish to turn; for whilst the word 
painting refers to the manifestation of the physical object, it also, more importantly for 
this discussion, refers to the act of painting itself, the application of paint onto a 
surface in the articulation of an illusory reality. This ability to represent in paint, upon 
a two-dimensional surface, the real world in such a way as to cause in the viewer an 
experience which is somehow like that of looking at the world, is called naturalism. 
Yet what does it really mean to say that a picture looks like the world? The 
mimetic claim made by naturalistic painting is not as straightforward or 
uncomplicated as it would appear. As the following investigation into the workings of 
naturalism will show, inextricably bound up with the concept are notions of visual and 
mental perception, cultural conventions of representation, the conditions of illusion, 
inherited technical strategies, and the practice of imitation. Yet these areas too are 
contested ones, and thus there has been little agreement between artists, theorists, and 
art-historians on the subject. What may be called naturalism is a highly contested 
category influenced and shaped by three millennia of conflicting ideas. 
The body of practical work which informed this investigation, was undertaken 
In order to develop my own pictorial language within the ambit of naturalistic 
painting, and in working towards this end, 1 was cognizant of the varying and 
conflicting ideas of what it was that actually constituted naturalism of depiction. Yet 
despite this written dissertation in which these ideas are explored and evaluated, 















In order then that practice does not become subsumed by theory, this investigation 
will return repeatedly to the problems involved in the actual production of naturalistic 
paintings, and that inexplicable moment when one suddenly attends to the illusory 
world of the picture, rather than just the materials of which that picture is made. 
* 
The subject of naturalism in art, and painting in particular, is a very broad one 
and draws from many different areas of study and discourse. As a student of painting, 
I intend for this dissertation to reflect, in theoretical terms, the investigations and 
explorations conducted within the paintings themselves. Issues such as the classical 
positions on painting, the heuretic functions of image-making and the social 
conditions which led to the rise of Western naturalism, whilst pertinent to the subject 
as a whole, will only be discussed briefly. Rather, the central line of inquiry of this 
dissertation will begin with an investigation into the role of vision in providing 
information - both true and fallacious - about the world. Through an exploration of 
the painted highlight in art, naturalism will be shown to have been a collective effort, 
and that acceptable pictorial equivalents for the real world were discovered and 
developed over long periods of time. Returning to the question which underlies this 
entire investigation, that is, what do we mean when we say that a picture looks like 
the world, various possible explanations for the way in which naturalistic pictures 
actually produce an experience which is like looking at the real world will be 
explored. 
Having shown pictorial naturalism to be an inherited and learnt language of 
conventions, the issue of artistic originality, and in particular, the use of the term in 
both an evaluative and non-evaluative way, will be examined. The historical practice 















what is learnt from others through imitation, becomes an integrated part of the artists' 
pictorial vocabulary, will be discussed. 
The concluding chapter of the dissertation does not make concrete deductions 
and conclusions so much as point to the ongoing nature of the project. Developing a 
pictorial language of naturalistic representation a language both learnt and specific 
to the artist - is a continuous process and thus cannot be concluded. This dissertation 
represents the first part of an exploration and learning process that will continue 
beyond this period of study. 
Terms and Definitions 
Before proceeding onto any discussion of naturalism, it will be useful to define the 
term in the way I intend to use it. By "naturalism" I am referring to art - and in 
particular the paradigm of painting the elements of which are presumed to coincide 
with the elements of visual or optical experience. 1 (The term naturalism does not 
include, for the purposes of this paper, photo-realism. Photo-realistic painting refers 
explicitly to the photographic source from which it was literally transcribed. 
Naturalism involves the translation of the visual information provided by the real 
world into the visual language of pictorial representation, which as we shall see, often 
bears scant resemblance to the real world.) The terms "naturalism" and "realism" are 
often used synonymously and interchanged freely with each other, but it is necessary 
to distinguish carefully between them. "Realism" - often mistakenly employed to 
describe that which appears "realistic", by which is actually meant "naturalistic" 
essentially describes a category of subject matter and refers to an artwork having a 
I To define naturalism thus is to overly simplifY it. For the purposes of this historical investigation into 
the circumstances with led to the rise of naturalism in western art, this definition will suffice; further 












concrete historical reference or an apparent historical reference. "Realism" thus 
concerns the content rather than the manner of representing. A painting could 
therefore be both realistic and naturalistic, although such a union is not necessary. 
Imaginary or fantastical subjects can be depicted in a naturalistic way, whilst real 
subject matter can be set against anti-naturalistic colour and drawing. 
The term "naturalism" also needs to be distinguished from the term 
"imitation" which is a broader category, referring to art that makes "artificial 
analogues" to things (Summers 1987: 3i, An imitated form may refer to a natural one 
but does not necessarily reduce it to its optical elements. Summers uses the example 
of a marching army shown as a frieze of undifferentiated soldiers, the simple 
repetition of the forms of the soldiers themselves made to stand for the army's 
movement without any further concessions to the description of the appearance of an 
army on the march (ibid). Naturalism is a kind of imitation, but one in which the 
"artificial analogue" is a relationship of visual elements determined in principle by the 
physical laws of sight and optics. What exactly these visual elements may be, and 
they precise way in which they operate within the picture to produce the effect of 
naturalism, will be explored. 
2 The tenn 'imitation' will be used in two different ways in this paper: as the imitation ofnature, or the 
world; and as the imitation of artistic precedents. At this point 'imitation' assumes the fonner meaning 












Naturalism and the Platonic legacy 
It can reasonably be said that there are few concepts more central to our notions of 
pictures than that of naturalism; simply put, to mean the practice of making pictures 
which can be said to resemble that which they denote. Even with the advent of 
modernism, when naturalism seems irrelevant, it remains the gravitational centre that 
directs all the surrounding discourse; abstract, non-representational and conceptual art 
had to be defined in terms of what they are not: naturalistic and representationaL 
Pictorial naturalism is at the foundation of our sense of Western art history and 
remains "indispensable to the difference between pictures and other visual artifacts" 
(Elkins, 1998: 7). Yet how are we to account for the development of naturalism? 
What were the particular historical and social conditions which led to the rise of this 
particular mode of representation? The following is a brief look at some of the major 
factors which led to the development of Western naturalism, including the classical 
positions regarding both the primacy and fallacies of sight. 
It would be simplistic to account for the emergence of naturalism as merely an 
inevitable consequence in the development of painting (any discussion of the arts in 
general, which of course were affected by the emergence of naturalism, is outside the 
ambit of this paper which is concerned with painting in particular). It would be 
equally incorrect, through the inappropriate application of critical hindsight, to 
assume that earlier medieval painters were aware of the failure of their images to 
achieve the kind of naturalistic fidelity that later painters of the Renaissance achieved, 
and thus attempt to account for the rise of naturalism; an assumption which 

















Summers' book The Judgement oj Sense: Renaissance Naturalism and the 
Rise ojAesthetics presents itself as an argument for the emergence of naturalism as 
complex set of pictorial inventions arising from meaning and immediately both 
amplifying and transforming meaning (Summers 1987). In order for Summers to ask 
why it is that art changes at the depth of the emergence of naturalism, and why these 
deep changes persist, he asks what we call naturalism might have meant in the Middle 
Ages and Renaissance, for in fact it meant many things. His investigation is guided by 
the hypothesis that the characteristics of naturalism as the precondition for 
Renaissance painting regardless of subject matter were themselves "both significant 
and value-laden, and that the development of these characteristics in their specific 
historical forms (Western naturalism really resembles no other naturalism) are only 
explainable in terms of those meanings and values" (Summers 1987: 11). Summers 
goes on to examine what these values might have been and explores in depth 
Renaissance notions of the primacy and fallacies of sight, beauty, the pleasures of 
sense and imagination, reason and will, common sense, cogitation, the mechanical 
arts, prudence and aesthetics. The argument proposes that the development of 
naturalism in the late Middle Ages was part of a vast and relentless transformation in 
attitude towards the world, which became visible in terms of the meaning of 
naturalism; and it is for this reason that naturalism is "deeply implicated in the rise of 
science, the rise of the individual, even the rise of the modern state" (Summers 1987: 
12). 
A more thorough discussion of the complex social, historical, artistic and 
philosophical circumstances which led to the rise of naturalism is unfortunately 
beyond the ambit of this dissertation. (Yet I hope to show that the development and 














trajectory in the history of painting. No less now is the decision to paint 
naturalistically an arbitrary or default one; it would be incorrect to assume that the 
conscious adoption of naturalism is of little conceptual significance to the practitioner; 
a discussion which shall be elaborated further in later chapters). Within this complex 
set of shifting values however, there is one thread which, as a student of painting 
working within the ambit of naturalism, is of particular interest and thus deserves 
further discussion: the role of sight in apprehending and translating the world. 
* 
Naturalism, defined as a visual coincidence between a painting and optical 
experience, ipso facto privileges the sense of sight. Complicating this notion however, 
as E. H. Gombrich insists, is that there is no innocent eye (Gombrich 1960: 297-8). 
The eye "always comes ancient to its work, obsessed by its own past and by old and 
new insinuations of the ear, nose, tongue, fingers, heart and brain" (Goodman 1968: 
7). The conflict between the truthful and the fallacious eye can be traced back to 
Plato, whose distrust of all the senses, particularly sight, is well known, as are his 
suspicions and reservations about the art of painting. 
If, as Plato believed, sight can perceive more that the mind can know than any 
of the other senses can, then everything that sight perceives is not true (Summers 
1987: 42). Strongly associating the realm of the senses with the irrational it was 
accepted that no wisdom or knowledge was to be found there; and precisely because it 
showed us the most about this realm, sight was most often deceived, since what it 
showed us was always fleeting and insubstantial. When enumerating the deceptions of 














condemns the painter; his power to reproduce owes to the "absolute superficiality" 
(ibid) of the art and its concern with mere appearances. Illustrating his argument with 
the analogy of the reflections upon the surface of a constantly moving mirror, the 
surface of which is a metaphor for the dazzling passage of visual phenomena, Plato 
claims that the painter does not imitate ideas, or even the copies of real forms, but 
only the appearance of these copies. "Mimetic art, then, is an inferior thing cohabiting 
with an inferior and engendering inferior offspring" (Plato Republic). The data of 
sight are thus phantasms, appearances of things in the light, in themselves without 
truth, illusive and chimerical. Pictorial art is condemned as an illusory, infinitely 
possible game with reality, and because, insofar as it inevitably stood apart from truth, 
was deeply related to fiction (Summers 1987: 44). 
The cataloguing of the fallacies of the senses - and especially sight - was 
commonplace in ancient, medieval, and Renaissance literature, and always turned 
around the problem of the relation of sense to truth (Nordenfalk 1985). The Skeptics 
turned the fallacies of sight to the purpose of discrediting all judgment concerning the 
nature of the world; basing their argument on the paradoxical changes in the 
appearance of things effected by changes in location of the viewer, like a ship which 
at a distance appears small and stationary, but large and in motion when nearby 
(Summers 1987: 45). 
Within the Christian vocabulary of the Middle Ages, derived in large part from 
Neoplatonic texts, the fully negative Platonic position toward the senses is retained; 
and is most strikingly expressed in the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, in which the 
sense organs by which the dying man may have sinned are anointed, so that, to quote 
a particular Sacramentary " the stains which through the Five Senses and weakness of 













of God might be purged" (Nordenfalk 1985: 227). In many late Medieval Books of 
Hours there are written prayers to the Virgin to protect the pious from sinning with the 
eyes and other senses (ibid). 
Yet, in spite of his enduring legacy of distrust, even Plato found occasion to 
praise sight: "Sight is the source of the greatest benefits to us; for if our eyes had 
never seen the sun, stars, and heavens, the words which we have spoken would not 
have been uttered. The sight of them and their revolutions has given us the knowledge 
of number and time, the power of inquiry, and philosophy, which is the greatest 
blessing of human life ... " (Plato Timaeus) Thus, in a conflict between reason and 
sense, Plato concedes that knowledge of the natural world can indeed proceed from 
sight, and, over and above this, the sustaining principles of order and harmony are 
most evident through it. This conflict extends to Plato's ambivalence toward painting, 
for whilst disapproval remains his dominant attitude towards it, he occasionally spoke 
of painting in more positive terms. Comparing his ideal philosopher state with "the 
fairest painting" (Plato Republic) Plato concedes that painting could in some sense 
look to the ideal; to reveal that which is more beautiful or godlike than others. Thus 
painting can both invent and discover and through this reveal true knowledge. Plato's 
contradictory positions find reconciliation in the idea that insofar as painting merely 
reflects and transcribes appearances it has no value; but insofar as it reveals and 
realises the ideal, it is worthy, a means by which the eye is elevated from an organ of 
sense to a privileged organ of sense, an indispensable tool for the understanding of 
more than we could otherwise know by simple sensation (Summers 1987). As a 
means of magnifying the power of sight, painting may thus even be a source of 












Aristotle believed that all men by nature desire to know and acqUIre 
knowledge, and justified this assertion through pointing out our delight in sense, and 
especially in sight. "For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not 
going to do anything, we prefer seeing to everything else. The reason is that this, most 
of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light many differences between things" 
(Aristotle Metaphysics). 
In his De rerum natura, Lucretius resolved the conflict between the fallacious 
and truthful eye by stating that the eyes simply see what they see, and this is the 
foundation of knowledge. The eye does not form opinions about what it sees, that is 
done by reason, and it is here that errors arise (Summers 1987: 44). "'Tis after all the 
reasoning of the mind that must decide; nor can our eyeballs know the nature of 
reality. And so attach then not this fault of mind to eyes, not lightly think our senses 
everywhere are tottering" (Lucretius De rerum natura). 
Having briefly sketched but a tiny sample of the vast historical literature 
regarding the eyes and the sense of sight, the question of how we are to thus explain 
the rise of naturalism, which naturally privileges this sense, remains. It is possible 
however, to glean from the ideas discussed above, that if, as Aristotle believed, our 
natural desire to know is evident in the value we place upon our senses, then it follows 
that we must learn through our senses, and thus we must be taught through sense. 
Images had always been justified as educational, argues Summers, but now they come 
to be accommodated to the conditions of finite human knowledge: "not that they be 
simply visible, but that they be like the visible; not that they be encountered, but that 
they be as ifencountered" (Summers 1987: 312-3). This represented world, so like the 
present, could carry the imagination and therefore the soul to the source of human 












simple and powerful teaching device and means to meditation. Naturalism becomes 
an integral part of the religious imagery of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance; the 
Franciscan Ugo Panziera, a contemporary of Giotto, argued, against the ideal of 
'higher' imageless devotion, that it is impossible to think of nothing; "all the wise 
determine that the soul may not remain idle for any interval of time" (Nordenfalk 
1985: 229). 
Naturalism in the visual arts is thus justified through the notion that perception 
forms the basis of all knowledge; the importance of art comes to be amplified 
precisely because it is visual and like the world. Yet, as we shall see later, these 
images could not initially just be referred to by painters at will; it was necessary to 
develop a visual language and acceptable methods of constructing such images, and to 
achieve consensus regarding their deployment. This meticulous and laborious 
endeavour, argues Summers, of inventing both vision and painting was "the long and 
splendid development of optical naturalism in the Middle Ages and early 
Renaissance" (Summers 1987: 313). 
Naturalism and the Painted Highlight 
What do we really mean when we define naturalism as a coincidence between 
the elements of a picture and optical experience? What actually occurs upon the 
painted surface that compels us at a certain point to attend to the contents of the 
picture and not its materials? An understanding of the complex circumstances 












understanding of how naturalism actually works. As a practitioner, one needs to move 
from theory into practice and ask what exactly the conditions of illusion may be. 
In the face of the vast tradition of Western painting, the only way to begin 
exploring this question was to apply it to one easily defined element of naturalistic 
painting; in this case I chose to apply it to that seductively simple and elegant mark: 
the painted highlight, or splendor. 
* 
A clever incident took place between Protogenes and Apelles. Proto genes 
lived at Rhodes, and Apelles made the voyage there from a desire to make 
himself acquainted with Protogenes's works, because that artist was only 
known to him by reputation. He went at once to Protogenes's studio. The 
artist was not there, but there was a panel of considerable size on the easel 
prepared for painting; and it was in the charge of a single old woman. In 
answer to his inquiry, she told him the artist was not at home, and asked who 
it was she should say had visited. 
"Say it was this person," answered Apelles, and taking a brush he painted 
an extremely fine line in colour across the panel. 
When Protogenes returned the old woman told him what had happened. 
The story goes that the artist, after looking closely at the finish of the line, 
said that the visitor must have been Apelles, because no one else could have 
made so perfect a work; and he himself, using another colour, drew a still 
finer line on top of the first one, and leaving the room told the attendant to 
show it to the visitor if he returned and added that this was the person he was 
searching for. 
And so it happened, since Apelles came back, and, ashamed to be beaten, 
cut the lines with another in a third colour, leaving no room for any further 
display of minute work. Afterward Protogenes admitted he had been defeated, 
and rushed down to the harbour to search for the visitor; and he decided that 
the panel should be handed down to posterity just as it was, to be admired as a 











The painted highlight, or splendor, is that tiny dot of paint, usually white or 
yellow, which, in the absence of tonal modeling, is used to describe the brightest point 
of light falling on an object. As we shall see, this method of describing an object's 
characteristic reaction to light forms an integral pal1 of the Dutch tradition of painting, 
and the following two illustrations of splendor, figures 1 and 2, were taken from the 
works of Vermeer. 
Fig. 1 Venneer Allegory oj/he Fig. 2 Vermeer Girl with a Pearl 
Faith (detail) 1672, Metropolitan Earring (detail) 1665, 
Museum of A11, New York Mauritshuis, The Hague 
Marks 
The difficulty when talking about pictures, lies in dealing appropriately with the 
Immense aggregation of theory to which pictures inevitably find themselves 
inextricably bound. The advantageous or deleterious effect of this theoretical 
accumulation is determined by the appropriate or inappropriate application of such 
theory to an analysis of one ' s own or someone else's work in either a sound or 
uninformed, indiscriminate and uncritical manner; which only narrows the scope of 
art into empty self-referentiality. Unquestionably, theory provides elegant solutions to 
problems both intellectual and practical. The difficulty lies in recognlsmg those 
situations where the application of theoretical solutions serves more to obfuscate than 
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to enlighten. James Elkins memorably stated in his book On Pictures and the Words 
That Fail Them (1998: xi): "What gets lost here is the picture as picture": in the 
application of theories to describe, pose and solve problems about what they mean, 
pictures become relatively easy to talk about and the fact of their painted, physical 
reality is often not so much ignored as evaded by theory which "often ceases to 
provide answers in the inchoate half-light between the splendour of rational 
representation and the darkness of non-verbal marking" (ibid). Pictures inhabit a 
space partly within, but also partly outside, systematic, logical and linguistic 
structures of meaning; thus, there are ways of talking about pictures in which the 
inevitable linguistic or semiotic model stops making sense and becomes counter­
intuitive (Elkins 1998). In other words, we lack the language required to fully describe 
pictures. 
This was precisely the problem with which I was faced when investigating the 
subject of the splendor. When talking about pictures on the minute level of not only 
individual marks, but of a very specific kind of mark, one lacks recourse to a 
definitive discourse, and is compelled to devise a strategy for talking about such 
marks. My intention therefore is, to distill from the large and diverse literature on the 
subject of mark-making in general and highlights in particular, several personally 
relevant ways of talking about splendor. Whilst failing to provide a satisfactory 
account of 3plendor when considered independently of each other, these ideas will 
perhaps when considered together, reflect the maxim that the whole is more than the 
sum of its parts. Predictably perhaps, but necessarily, these investigations will be art­
historical, theoretical, and technical, though maintaining such clear delineation 
between these concerns is impossible, for, as any painter will know, paint has its own 











A History ofLight and Shade 
Simply put, the distribution of light and shade helps us to perceive the forms of 
things; the nature of reflections tells us about their surface texture. A matt surface 
reveals the direction from which light strikes the object and has the effect of 
modelling and indicating form. This type of illumination is entirely objective in that it 
depends solely upon the position of the object in relation to the light source. The 
effect of lustre, which occurs on shiny surfaces, is literally a mirror image composed 
and distorted upon a surface whose physical properties tend to reflect the light source; 
and as with all mirror images the places where these highlights occur depend, unlike 
upon a matt surface, not only on the angle of incidence of the light rays, but on the 
position of the viewer. A flat mirror for example, will hold a particular reflection only 
so long as we keep it and ourselves still and maintain a position relative to each other. 
Possessed of binocular vision, we do not even see these highlights in the same place 
with each eye and as mirror images these highlights appear to lie behind the reflecting 
surface - an effect which affords lustre its peculiar hovering quality. The perception 
of highlights upon a reflective surface is thus largely subjective, maintaining neither a 
fixed position upon the surface nor providing a naturalistic indication of volume and 
form. 
Nonetheless, the shape and position of highlights offer the viewer clues to the 
form of the reflecting surface. A curved surface will collect more or less light 
depending on whether it has a convex or concave shape and will thus reflect images 
from a wider or narrower sweep of its surroundings respectively. The more steeply 
curved a surface, the greater the amount of light it will gather and thus intensify; the 















it is consequently on the ridges and comers of objects that highlights appear most 
frequently (Marshall 1981). 
Yet not all effects of lustre are dependent on the relative position of the viewer 
and object: a diamond which has had its surfaces polished into many flat facets will 
catch the light differently at every slight movement, yet the gleam of a round pearl 
remains relatively constant (Gombrich 1976). The complexities of light are too great 
to be dealt with adequately at this time: my brief sketch above will suffice as an 
illustration of the difference in physical causality between objective modelling light 
and sUbjective reflection. 
Painting with Light and Shade 
Goethe, in Farbenlehre, speaks of "the actions and sufferings of light" yet art history 
has largely ignored light's role in representations of the world (Gombrich 1976: 4-5). 
That art has a history is due to the fact that methods of constructing images have had 
to be developed, learnt and passed on to the next generation of artists; a fact which 
demanded that innovation occur gradually, thus allowing the art historian to trace 
connections and conventions in styles which aim both at a faithful rendering of the 
world and that deviate from reality (ibid). 
The preservation of literary testimonies dating from as far back as late 
antiquity and the physical evidence contained within a few preserved artworks 
themselves, allow us to trace the history of the painted highlight and the subsequent 
divergent practice of representing light in the Northern and Italian schools. In his 












Longinus compared the effect of certain rhetorical devices with the effect oflight in a 
painting: 
Though the colours of shadow and of light lie in the same plane, side by side, 
yet the light immediately leaps to the eye and appears not only to protrude, 
but actually to be much nearer. (Gombrich 1976: 5) 
In the fifth century A.D. Philoponos, in his commentary to Aristotle's 
Meteoro!ogica, wrote: 
If you put white and black upon the same surface and then look at it from a 
distance, the white will always seem much nearer and the black further off 
(ibid). 
Philoponos then proceeds to lay down certain rules for the correct use of dark 
shade when depicting such hollow objects as wells, cisterns or caves, and of light 
when depicting prominent objects such as an outstretched hand or the legs of a horse. 
Of course, these rules do not always hold true: light can penetrate a recess and hollow 
spaces can reflect light. The assessment of likelihood, however, plays a large role in 
our visual reactions and our perceptual system responds to these indications of 
probabilities without our even being aware of their cause (Gombrich 1976). The 
practice of ancient artists therefore conformed to Philoponos' rule; the evidence of 
which can be seen in ancient mosaics in which caves and hollows are depicted in 
black, and white lines on tree trunks and rounded objects contribute to their three­
dimensional effect. 
However, Philoponos' rule presents an oversimplification, for ordinarily light 












on the upward curve of an object; a skyward shift of the highlight of which ancient 
painters were well aware.3 The distinction thus made between illumination and 
reflection required a new terminology: light becomes lumen; and lustre, or reflection, 
becomes splendor (ibid). 
These observations became embodied within traditional artistic formulae for 
the naturalistic rendering of the world; formulae which passed on from antiquity to 
both the Byzantine and Western tradition of the middle Ages. In Art and Illusion 
Gombrich illustrates the persistence of this tradition in examples which display 
identical highlights both upon the cheek of Theseus in a mural from Herculaneum and 
upon the cheeks of saints in twelfth century frescoes from Eastern Europe: a formula 
which survived more than one thousand years of artistic development. The question 
which Gombrich poses at this point concerns the function of this seemingly innocuous 
white highlight: is it still a highlight and thus conceived as a reflection, or has its 
function been downgraded to that of mere modelling? It is of interest to note that even 
modern historians have neglected this difference between lumen and splendor; 
perhaps, as Elkins postulates, this omission is due to the effect of two contradictory 
trends in the art of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, trends which undoubtedly 
influenced the observational bias of art historians, namely, Impressionism and 
Expressionism. In his publication of The Vienna Genesis an early Christian 
manuscript - in 1895, Franz Wickhoffintroduced the term 'illusionism' to refer to the 
loose and deft brushwork of Roman decorative paintings and disregarded the close 
application to the study of modelling and highlights which he regarded as part of the 
academic tradition; a disregard he bequeathed to art history (Elkins 1998). 
3 Whilst the light falling on an object is modified by light reflected off surrounding surfaces, in the 
absence of extreme or unusual conditions, the source of brightest light - for a scene depicted in clear 













Expressionism positioned itself even more strongly against academic concerns; 
remoteness from a 'photographic' translation of the world became a positive value 
within a movement for which the expressive qualities of line and colour are what 
mattered. 
Byzantine and medieval painting, however, greatly valued the characteristic of 
luminosity as an artistic element, though whether tied to spiritual values or due to the 
convenience of application of a learnt convention, is unclear (Gombrich 1976). 
Beauty was identified with and expressed through splendour, and the means of 
conveying splendor acquired a new meaning for the Middle Ages as the formula was 
translated from white painted highlight into gold, in favour of a general effect of 
splendour (ibid). Yet despite this partial loss of differentiation between lumen and 
splendor, residual distinctions remain, albeit in highly formulaic and schematic form. 
The conventions and formulae present in medieval painting whose derivation from 
ancient mural painters is easily traced are too numerous to be adequately addressed 
here. Suffice to say that the method of application of highlights to indicate form ­
though often employed with little rational justification - survived within a style which 
had otherwise discarded naturalistic methods of modelling. The reduction of a 
principle originally devised to aid in the naturalistic rendering of form to such an 
abstracted formula which in all likelihood was applied by medieval craftsmen without 
any awareness of the rationale behind the tradition, makes it dangerous for us to 
presume to perceive meaning through the use of such ambiguous and illogical 
highlighting effects. Rather, we need to ask how it is that, within a style for which 
naturalism was not an aim, such an artistic device persisted, particularly when one 
considers that it was this device which gave rise to one of the most tenacious 












representations of landscape features (Gombrich 1976). This convention departs 
entirely from the method of tonal modelling; rather, steps of rocks are depicted in 
even light which increases in brightness as the step advances toward the viewer, the 
foremost edge gleaming with an unnatural lustre (ibid). The numerous examples of 
such gleaming rocks points to the evolution of a formula which had increasingly lost 
contact with observation. Is the persistence of this highlighting convention merely the 
result of thoughtless copying on the part of medieval artists, or can we trace its use 
back to the rule of Philoponos from which was extrapolated the rule that highlighting 
a ridge will counteract the possibility of ambiguity inherent in the depiction of 
grazing, or laterally falling, light? (Gombrich 1976). This ambiguity has, I am sure, 
been experienced by most people it is the visual confusion which can arise when 
looking at an image in which any roughly geometric object such as a flight of stairs, 
rather than being depicted in gently modelling light, is painted on a purely tonal scale, 
that is, in adjacent areas of flat colour of varying tone. Such an object may appear to 
volumetrically 'reverse'; those parts which protrude appear to recede and vice versa. 
Apply a gleaming edge to the object, however, and it will resist this kind of apparent 
transformation. Gombrich believes that despite the loss of differentiation between 
lumen and splendor in Byzantine and Medieval paintings, the methods and devices 
developed in Hellenistic painting for the rendering of light had not been entirely 
abandoned, but rather that this vocabulary of ancient art was used in what Vasari 
called the 'Greek Manner' (ibid) albeit in a highly stylised and crude way. 4 
4 There exists much visual evidence to suggest that this particular Western painterly device spread 
eastwards and influenced art production in Central Asia, Mongolia, China and Japan. Gombrich 
provides a concise summary of the writings of various historians on this subject and presents it 












Persistence of Tradition 
Art historians often define the Renaissance in both Northern and Southern Europe in 
terms of a deliberate eschewing of the past and a fresh discovery of the world: a view 
which tends to exclude considerations regarding the persistence of artistic traditions. 
As a student of painting concerned with exploring varying methods of naturalistic 
representation, the most interesting distinction between the Northern and Southern 
traditions lies in their diametrically opposed ways of seeing and rendering light; a 
difference not merely accidental, but arising out of a difference in conception of the 
world. Earlier in this dissertation I briefly sketched the causal difference between 
illumination and reflection, and stated the incontrovertible fact that whilst illumination 
exists objectively, the perception of highlights is entirely subjective: a difference 
which I believe forms the basis for this distinction between the Northern and 
Southern, or Italian, traditions. 
Leonardo Da Vinci's treatise on painting clearly differentiates between lumen 
and splendor, and although this text was not published until 1651, one hundred and 
thirty-two years after his death (White 2000), Italian artists and craftsmen were well 
acquainted with his work; yet it was not in Italy that the greatest advances in the 
rendering of surface texture through the use of specular highlights were made. 
Considering then the artistic revolution of the Renaissance in terms of artistic 
continuity, we need to ask why it was that Italy occupied itself with the development 
of perspective and thus with the mathematically precise methods of revealing form in 
ambient light, whilst the other aspect of optical theory, that of the reaction of light 












were indisputably the greatest masters of lustre, sparkle and glitter as rendered 
through the skillful application of surface splendores. 
The best way of answering this question is to turn to the textual evidence: the 
volume of writing on the subject of painting by both the artists of the Quattrocento 
themselves and writers such as Alberti and Vasari, is vast and, as such, cannot be 
covered within the limited scope of this dissertation.5 It is however, an 
incontrovertible fact that the course of human development has often been shaped by 
one man's beliefs; beliefs which influence thinking on local, national or global levels. 
Gombrich presents a compelling argument tor the widespread influence of just such 
an individual: Cennino Cennini and his text Libro dell 'arte, written at the very end of 
the thirteenth century and on the threshold of the Renaissance. This text is an 
important source of our knowledge of medieval conventialism; his strict and precise 
instructions for the painting of drapery and flesh for instance, contain scant reference 
to natural appearances. For the purposes of this dissertation, the most telling aspect of 
Libro dell 'arte is Cennini's complete lack of awareness that different materials should 
receive more or less white on their ridges according to their tendency to reflect or 
absorb light (Gombrich 1976); an omission due entirely to the medieval legacy of the 
loss of distinction between the functions of lumen and splendor. He proceeds to 
advise artists who wish to depict the textures of such materials as wool, velvet and 
silk, to imitate directly upon the surface which is to be painted, the actual texture of 
the material to be painted. Thus the artist is advised to copy or duplicate the actual 
material texture and character of the object depicted, rather than its characteristic 
reaction to light (ibid). Gombrich argues for Giotto as the source of this tradition as 
Cennini's master had in tum studied under Giotto. Whilst medieval artists had lost the 
5 These texts include Vasari's The Lives of the Painters, Sculptors and Architects Volumes I, II, III; 











desire and the capacity for conveying the distinction between illumination and 
reflection, Giotto moved away from this undifferentiated convention of painting light 
and had instead concentrated on illumination alone as an articulator of form. Thus in 
Libra dell 'arte can Giotto's influence be felt in the recommended procedures which 
concentrate on the modelling of form from light to shade to create an impression of 
solidity. This type of meticulous blending of tone devalues the function of the painted 
highlight and such accents are subsequently subordinated to the establishment of 
structure (ibid). 
In the works of Massacio the clarification of form within a field of uniform 
illumination coincides with the first attempts at the application of scientific 
perspective: a combination which was to consolidate the effect of sculptural solidity 
and firmness that we still associate with Italian art (Gombrich 1976). This increased 
emphasis in modelling in firm planes necessitated increasing attention to the imagined 
fall of light and the effect of tonal gradation: a procedure which automatically 
excludes the ancient and medieval convention of marking the foremost ridge with 
white. Thus the achievement of the Italian school remains the clarification of 
structure, not texture; the flickering highlights that shift with position have no place in 
this rational and above all, objectified world. "The rule of Philoponos has been 
rendered obsolete" (Gombrich 1976: 29). 
Gombrich hypothesises that these reforms did not affect the tradition of 
Northern painting to the same degree as Italian painting, that it was therefore easier 
for painters in the North to rediscover the pictorial potential of the white highlight in 
pursuit of the wholly un-Italian effect of subjectively perceived reflection. Whilst to 
Italian painters the appearance of unstable reflections upon the surface of objects was 












their search for fonn, some Northern artists became fascinated by the sheer and 
unexpected power of such highlights to powerfully reveal and invoke myriad surface 
textures (ibid). 
It is precisely this observational and painterly occupation with light which 
allows a direct line of artistic tradition to be drawn between the Northern school and 
the ancient Hellenistic painters. Despite the fact that the virtuosity and subtlety 
required to render these effects of light eluded medieval craftsmen and was virtually 
lost, it can be argued that the new visual explorations of the fifteenth-century northern 
painters took as their starting point the ancient practices of Greek artists. A most 
profound difference between Italian and Northern painting thus lies less in the 
contrast of technique and media than in their divergent approach to visible phenomena 
(a distinction appropriate to the subject of this dissertation, and not discounting other 
fonnal, conceptual and narrative differences). 
Whilst Gombrich's hypothesis certainly presents a plausible account of the 
adoption by the two principal schools of European painting of such disparate 
identities with regard to the seemingly insignificant and innocuous highlight, as a 
student of painting my interest lies primarily in the consequences attendant upon the 
application of these fundamentally opposed ways of seeing to the act of painting 














To reiterate an earlier statement, there is perhaps no concept more central to our 
notions of pictures than that of 'naturalism', taking the term to mean the practice of 
making pictures which can be said to resemble that which they denote. Pictorial 
naturalism is at the foundation of our sense of Western art history and remains 
indispensable to the difference between pictures and other visual artifacts (Elkins 
1998). Yet it remains the most embattled of the founding concepts of pictures; with 
theories of resemblance and representation first arising more than two thousand years 
ago, it continues to provoke debate and dissent. An overview of all the theories of 
representation would be impossible. What follows is an examination of those major 
theories most relevant to my investigation and which most closely follow the 
explorations being conducted concurrently within my paintings. 
An investigation into theories of representation would gain little from those 
writers who disparage the very notion of describing pictorial naturalism as irrelevant, 
unnecessary or uninteresting, and who would encourage that we turn away from such 
'old' problems. It is more useful to look at those writers who, whilst preferring not to 















formulated approximate theories regarding how it is that it works.6 
An explicit kind of theorising is exemplified by Richard Wollheim who 
proposes that naturalism comes about through a "twofoldness": that is, a reciprocal 
relation between seeing objects 'in' pictures and an awareness of the "marked surface 
itself' (Wollheim 1980: 205-227). Wollheim proceeds to contrast this theory with five 
'competitors', which can be summarised as follows: 
The illusion view, that naturalistic pictures provide a "false perceptual belief' 
(ibid) of the presence of the represented object. 
The make-believe view, that naturalistic pictures work by enticing us to believe 
that we are "face-to-face" with the represented object.7 
The resemblance view, that naturalistic pictures "produce an experience which 
is like the experience of looking" at the represented object (ibid). 
The information view, that naturalistic pictures "give us the same information 
as we should receive if we saw" the represented objects (ibid). 
The semiotic view, that naturalistic pictures seem so by "belonging to a symbol 
system" which is somehow linked to the represented object (ibid). 
6 Postmodem writers have written extensively around the concepts of reality and imitation, mimesis 
and similitude. Jean Baudrillard, in his Similacra and Simulation, illustrates, through his study of Pop 
art and ultra-naturalistic trompe l'oeil painting, the way in which simulacra came to replace replicate 
reality and the process whereby it became increasingly difficult to distinguish between simulacra and 
reality. "To dissimulate is to pretend not to have what one has. To simulate is to feign to have what one 
doesn't have... therefore pretending, or dissimulating, leaves the principle of reality intact: the 
difference is always clear, it is simply masked, whereas simulation threatens the difference between the 
'true' and the 'false', the 'real' and the 'imaginary'."{I994: 3) For Baudrillard, illusion is no longer 
possible because the real is no longer possible. 
Umberto Eco, in his essay Travels in Hyperreality, examines America's obsession with realism, where, 
if a reconstruction is to be credible, it must be absolutely iconic, a perfect likeness, a "real" copy of the 
reality being represented. The American imagination demands the real thing and, to attain it, must 
fabricate the absolute fake, or what Eco terms it: 'hyperreality'. The 'completely real' becomes 
identified with the 'completely fake' (1998: 7). 
Relevant as these theories are to the broader subject of naturalism I will not however, examine them 
within the body of this paper as they fall outside of the line of investigation pursued by it. 
7 Whilst the illusion and make-believe view may seem too similar to merit separate names, they are 
differentiated by virtue of the first implying a delusion on the part of the viewer, and the second a 











By the standards of actual pictures however, both Wollheim's and his 
competitors' theories remain somewhat vague. Crispin Sartwell criticises Wollheim 
for being both imprecise and incomplete. Even after a thorough reading of Wollheim, 
Sartwell says: "one could still reasonably wonder whether it actually explains pictorial 
realism in an interesting way" (Sartwell 1994: 2). The difficult part, he believes, is 
accounting for the fact that "we can readily see items in the marked surface" (ibid). 
Despite Sartwell's accurate assessment of Wollheim, however, he fails to make any 
significant contribution to the debate with his claim that: "[a] picture is realistic to the 
extent that its visually discernible, variable properties overlap with the recognitionally 
relevant properties of its objects" (ibid), a claim which is really little more than a 
slight variation on Wollheim's 'resemblance view'. 
A more elaborate interrogation is provided by N lson Goodman in Languages 
ofArt who, dismissing the naIve view of representation as expressed by the well-worn 
formula "A represents B if and only if A appreciably resembles B" (1968: 3), 
approaches the problem by examining those characteristics of pictures which are 
commonly believed to constitute naturalism of representation. Pertinent to this 
discussion are the ideas of denotation and imitation. 
A picture, argues Goodman, in order to represent an object, must be a symbol 
for it, stand for it, refer to it; and that no degree of resemblance is sufficient to 
establish the requisite relationship of reference. Resemblance is not necessary for 
reference because almost anything can stand for almost anything else. A picture that 
represents an object, continues Goodman, refers to and denotes it. "Denotation is the 
core of representation and is independent of resemblance" (1968: 5). 
The flaw in the simple-minded statement "to make a faithful picture, come as 






v." ...... , ... SU1[Il(;:r lru
IS











object before one may be "called a man, a swarm of atoms, a complex of cells, a 
friend, a fool and more" (ibid). If these are all ways the object is, then none is the way 
the object is. The copy theory is confounded by its inability to specify what is to be 
copied (ibid). 
Thus Goodman, after arriving at the conclusion that resemblance to reality 
does not constitute naturalism8 of representation, yet noting that we do in fact 
compare representations with respect to their naturalism or fidelity, asks what the 
criteria for naturalism is (Goodman 1976). He dismisses the popular notion that the 
test of fidelity is deception and that a picture is naturalistic just to the extent that it is a 
successful illusion which leads the viewer to suppose that it is, or has the 
characteristics of what it represents; the proposed measure of naturalism therefore 
being the "probability of confusing the representation with the represented" 
(Goodman 1968: 34). The difficulty with this lies in that what deceives depends on 
what is observed, and what is observed depends upon and varies with, the interests 
and habits of the viewer (ibid). This probability of confusion is extremely low for 
even the most skillfully painted trompe-l 'oei! picture seen under ordinary conditions, 
for "seeing a picture as a picture precludes mistaking it for anything else"(Goodman 
1968: 35) and the conditions of observation - framing, uniform background - are 
calculated to defeat deception. Deception necessitates such devices as a suggestive 
setting, or the occlusion of frame and background through a viewing device. Thus 
deception under such conditions is no test of naturalism, for, with enough staging, 
even the most 'unrealistic' picture can deceive (ibid). Rather, Goodman says, one 
recognises pictures as signs for the objects represented: signs which work without 
being confused with what they denote (ibid). This idea would tend to suggest that the 
8 I have substituted Goodman's use of the term "realism" with the term "naturalism" for the sake of 











most 'naturalistic' picture is the one which provides the greatest amount of 
information pertinent to the object being represented. But information-preserving 
transformations are possible: 'naturalistic' and 'unnaturalistic' pictures may be 
equally informative (Goodman 1968: 36). If informational yield is no test of 
naturalism, Goodman argues, then the ease with which this information issues is. And 
this depends "upon how stereotyped the mode of representation is, upon how 
commonplace the labels and their uses have become"(ibid). Naturalism therefore, is 
relative, and "determined by the system of representation which is standard for a 
given culture or person at a given time" (Goodman 1968: 37) (a subject which will be 
explored more fully). Goodman concludes by stating that naturalism is a matter not of 
any constant or absolute relationship between a picture and its object but of a 
relationship between the system of representation employed in the picture and the 
standard system (ibid). In other words, we think a picture looks like nature only 
because that is the way nature is usually painted. 
This symbol theory of pictures would seem to provide an answer to one of the 
great riddles of naturalistic painting: how it is that naturalistic works can differ 
stylistically so radically from one another and yet still produce the effect of 
naturalism. Renaissance writers seemed undisturbed by the fact that the world could 
be pleasingly and convincingly painted in a great number of ways (Summers 1987). 
If, however, painting what one sees cannot be understood as an imitation or copy of 
an independent given reality, then the question of how the naturalistic artists' claim to 
objectivity and the undeniable subjectivity of their product is to be reconciled, 
disappears. 
Yet the symbol theory appears to contain a logical contradiction: if naturalism 


















the picture and the standard system of representation, then perception is essentially 
interpretive. This being the case, we would have no recourse to any objective reality 
whatsoever against which to measure the level of naturalism of a given picture, and 
the argument would collapse under the weight of its own pointlessness.9 
Symbol theory also focuses on the ontological difference between pictures and 
the world they depict; the argument runs that since pictures are composed with marks 
upon a flat surface, whilst the reality they represent exists in three-dimensional space, 
paintings are thus more like other paintings than they are like the things they represent 
(Goodman 1976). This problem has been called the 'crisis of twentieth-century art', a 
problem borne of the artist's self-consciousness about the problem of transforming 
three dimensions into two, yet Alberti's Della Pittura of 1435 deals explicitly with the 
problem of rendering three-dimensional reality upon a flat canvas (Blinder 1986). 
This problem then, is not a modern one, rather it is the problem of naturalistic picture 
making. And whilst there is much truth in saying that paintings are more like other 
paintings than the world they depict, the difference between two-dimensional images 
and three-dimensional reality does not preclude us from saying that a picture 
naturalistically represents something insofar as it would look sufficiently like the real 
thing would to an observer. Thus, the most basic question of how it is that we can 
readily recognise things on a marked surface, remains essentially unanswered, for 
there must be something more that we can say about a picture of Table Mountain, for 
instance, that makes it a picture of Table Mountain and nothing else. 
The assumption with which Goodman began his argument is that pictures are 
representations. Max Black problematises this assumption by asking what it is that 
9 The limited scope of this dissertation prevents both a more thorough exploration of symbol theory and 
its assumption that pictorial symbols function in representational art in much the same way as words 
function within verbal language; and the contrasting of this theory with its major competitors. Rather, I 












makes any naturalistic picture a representation of its subject (1972). Black considers 
various answers to the analysis of the statement "P depicts S"; two of which are of 
particular interest to this paper's line of investigation. The first of these two 
propositions concerns the producer's ~ or more specifically the artist's - intentions. If 
we can know what the artist intended to visually represent, runs the argument, then we 
can know what is being represented. This position, however, assumes the infallibility 
of the artist's intentions: simply wanting to make a picture ofx or y would necessarily 
make it so (Black 1972). This paradoxical notion would necessitate that as we would 
say of a botched and unrecognisable picture "He intended to draw x but failed", we 
should say of any failed intention, for the notion of intention involves the possibility 
of failure (ibid). 
The second proposition which is of interest is that of depiction as illusion. We 
still need, argues Black, "to isolate something about the representation itself that will 
enable a viewer to perceive in the art object something about P that makes it a picture 
of P and nothing else" (Black 1972: 113). Black echoes Gombrich's discussion of 
"illusion" (to which I will return) in saying that when one looks at a naturalistic 
painting of x - Black uses the example of a white poodle on a sofa - it is as if, looking 
through the picture frame, one actually saw an animal of a certain appearance, resting 
on a piece of furniture at a certain distance. What distinguishes this illusion from 
delusion is the fact that we are not really deceived, but have enough visual experience 
to know that we see what it would be like if the poodle were really there (Black 
1972). This is what Coleridge described as the willing suspension of disbelief; and 
what Plato despised as a sacrifice of the higher faculties in favour of the lower reaches 
of the soul (Gombrich 1973). This account seems to fit all cases of response to even 















completely unfamiliar or fantastical (remembering that non-real and imaginary subject 
can be depicted naturalistically). Objections to this account includes that which draws 
our attention to the inevitable distortions which occur in even the most naturalistic of 
paintings; the viewer will see the brushstrokes for instance, and will thus become 
aware that what he is seeing is not very much like the real thing, a point that recalls 
Goodman's statement that "seeing a picture as a picture precludes mistaking it for 
anything else" (Goodman 1968: 34-35). Once we have learned how to look through 
the distorting medium of paintings, continues Black, we shall simply see the depicted 
objects as if they were really present. The phrase "once we have learnt how things 
look" concedes, however, that in many cases the subject does not look in the painting 
as it would if it were really present behind the picture plane. 
Common to the three arguments presented above is the idea of pictorial 
naturalism as relative to learnt cultural conventions. In the same year that Goodman's 
Languages 0.(Art was published, Gombrich wrote: 
Every tradition develops an idiom or code in which certain features of visual 
reality can be recorded or encoded. Once the attention of the artist and of the 
public has become focused on a certain method of suggesting reality the 
painter is likely to watch out for those effects he can best express in his 
system (1976). 
To borrow Black's formulaic expression: "In general, P is a representation of 
S, if P looks like S, according to the conventions embodied in the artist's style and 
technique". Realism is relative, argues Goodman, and determined by the system of 
representation standard for a given culture or person at a given time; a relativity 
ordinarily "obscured by our tendency to omit specifying a frame of reference when it 

















modes of depiction, and once again, we say that a picture looks like nature only 
because that is the way nature is usually painted. In other words, paintings teach us to 
perceive paintings. 
If we accept that naturalism is thus a matter of habituation, we need to ask 
how these accepted modes of depiction are known. Margaret Hagen believes that this 
knowledge is tacit; not necessarily conscious or explicit and that the viewer is bound 
by this tacit knowledge of the rules for depiction in judging which pictures look 
naturalistic lO (1986). Rudolf Arnheim argued that pictures seen as very "lifelike'" 
such as those of Giotto, were judged from a context of familiarity with those pictures 
that had preceded them within the culture (Arnheim 1954). He wrote that it was the 
"deviation from the prevailing norm of pictorial representation that produced in the 
viewer the astonishing effect of naturalism or "lifelikedness" in Giotto's pictures" 
(Hagen 1986: 86). This is not to say that any randomly selected deviation from the 
accepted modes of representation will necessarily produce this advance toward 
naturalism, but as the history of Western art can be seen to a great extent as an 
advance toward photographic naturalism, the argument could be made that any 
stylistic change in that direction would produce a greater effect of naturalism (Hagen 
1986). Thus we learn about how pictures work - in the context of our specific set of 
cultural conventions - within the world of pictures, and not within the outside world II 
The obvious question which this raises is whether the role of cultural 
conventions can fully account for the fact that we can identify a painting of a horse as 
10 Gombrich provided anecdotal evidence for the argument that judgements of naturalistic depiction are 
culture bound in his account of the Japanese man who could make no sense of the apparent 
"distortions" of Western perspective upon first encountering it, but who later, after habituation, found 
them to be more naturalistic than his traditional conventions (1960). 
II These pictorial conventions include: Position in the visual field; linear perspective; texture gradient; 
relative size of objects; shadow; overlay and aerial perspective. In speaking about naturalistic painting, 
I have assumed knowledge on the part of the reader of these most basic of illusionistic devices and 












such. Is it at all reasonable to assume that I, as the viewer, am so entirely a product of 
my cultural environment that I cannot perceive anything I have not been taught to? Is 
there a limit to pictorial relativism? H. E. Hinton's exploration of the visual 
deceptions that have arisen in nature through evolutionary pressure to survive even at 
the expense of another species - for example, the way certain insects resemble twigs 
or leaves, or the false eyes on a butterfly's wings would suggest that there is (1973). 
Gombrich points out that what looks like a leaf to modem humans must also have 
looked like a leaf to predators in distant geological epochs (1973). It seems that there 
must exist certain commonalities of visual experience, independent of pictorial 
conventions. 
As we saw earlier, Goodman dismissed the resemblance theory of naturalism, 
which states that pictures succeed as representations because they contain the same 
kind of information as the world, by pointing out that naturalistic and unnaturalistic 
pictures can be equally informative. There is however, another proposition offered by 
general resemblance theory which proposes that there is a one-to-one mapping of the 
visible surfaces of the world onto the picture plane, and from there into the eye. The 
most obvious example of this, and one through which the limits of pictorial relativism 
can be examined, is that of perspective; the development and adoption of which 
during the Renaissance is generally accepted as having facilitated a great advance in 
naturalistic depiction. The question is whether the laws of perspective provide an 
absolute and objective standard that overrides differences in style of depiction and 
. f' 12conventIOns 0 seemg. 
An answer could begin with the incontrovertible fact which forms the basis of 
perspective theory: light moves only in straight lines, and consequently, we cannot see 
12 For the history of perspective see: S. Edgerton The Renaissance Rediscovery of Linear Perspective 











around corners. These are physical laws which govern the behaviour of light and are 
thus no more conventional than any other scientific law. Yet Herbert Read wrote that 
"we do not always realise that the theory of perspective developed in the fifteenth 
century is a scientific convention; it is merely one way of describing space and has no 
absolute validity." (1956: 66). 
In contrast, James Gibson defended the "naturalness" oflinear13 perspective 
constructions and wrote that " .. .it does not seem reasonable to assert that the use of 
perspective in paintings is merely a convention, to be used or discarded by the painter 
as he chooses" (1960: 227), and Gombrich derided the idea that perspective is merely 
a convention and declared: "One cannot insist enough that the art of perspective aims 
at a correct equation: It wants the image to appear like the object and the object like 
the image."(Gombrich 1960: 217). According to linear, or artificial, perspective, the 
laws of projective geometry provide the answer to the problem of accurately 
reproducing on a flat surface the real world as it appears from a particular point. Once 
the station point the vantage point from which the artist chooses to depict a scene 
and includes only that which can be seen from that point without moving - and 
picture-plane are established relative to the scene to be depicted, there is, perspective 
theory maintains, only one pictorial image that will accurately represent that scene. 
This occurs because light rays connect each point on the surface of the real scene 
facing the viewer to a corresponding point on the picture-plane placed at a right angle 
to the artist's line of vision. The picture-plane thus becomes what Alberti called the 
"open window" on the world (Blinder 1986: 21). 
13 Gibson distinguishes carefully between what he terms 'natural' and 'linear' perspective; the former 
defined as the geometry of light that strikes the eye, a Euclidean geometry made up of the array of 
visual angles formed by the reflection of light rrom the visible surfaces of objects to the eye; the latter, 
also known as 'artificial perspective', referring to the theory of projection on a transparent picture plane 












The anamorphic l4 image in Holbein the Younger's The Ambassadors and the 
Ames chair demonstrations (in which the objects viewed through three peepholes 
appeared to be three identical chairs; yet when examined from another, unconstrained 
angle, are found to be an incoherent collection of lines and shapes which create the 
illusion of a chair when viewed correctly (Gombrich 1960) require the viewer's 
collaboration in the reading of perspective pictures; what Gombrich calls 'the 
beholder's share' (1960: 210). Whilst Goodman argues that the conditions of 
observation for such images, i.e. through a peephole with one transfixed eye, point to 
the failure of linear perspective to provide an absolute visual truth, Gombrich argues 
that this viewer collaboration does not contradict the contention that perspective is in 
fact a valid method of constructing images designed to create illusion. David Blinder, 
defending Gibson's artificial perspective, argues that this kind of frozen 'aperture' 
vision constitutes "the artifiCiality, but not the conventionality", of linear perspective 
(Blinder 1986: 25). 
The assumption made by perspective theory is that artificial, or linear, 
perspective obeys the laws of geometrical optics, and that a picture constructed 
according to these pictorial rules matches the natural perspective of the depicted 
scene. In certain instances, however, this assumption is clearly erroneous. Goodman 
illustrates this fallacy through a comparison with the way in which, in accordance 
with the pictorial rules, railroad tracks running outward from the eye are drawn as 
convergent, whereas telephone poles running upward from the eye are drawn parallel 
(1968). Yet by the laws of natural perspective, and this is easily verified by anyone, 
the poles should also be seen as converging; but when drawn as such, appear as wrong 
as would railway tracks which remained parallel. Thus the rules of pictorial 
14 The technical tenn for an image drawn on an oblique or curved surface which, when viewed from the 












perspective seem to have diverged from the laws of optics which govern natural 
perspective; and if "the behaviour of light sanctions neither our usual nor any other 
way of rendering space"(Goodman 1968: 19), then perspective would appear to 
provide no absolute standard of pictorial objectivity. 
It would not, however, be unreasonable to say that the science of pictorial 
perspective occupies a space along the continuum between absolute objectivity and 
conventionality, for it is important to remember that it is founded upon an 
indisputable scientific law, which, for our purposes, holds true under all conditions. 
The single station-point adopted by Western artists, presumed to be a mere convention 
by virtue of the fact that the pictorial perspective constructions of non-Western 
cultures often employ mUltiple view-points within a single image, should rather be 
seen as the closest possible approximation to the way that we actually see. (The small 
difference in the angle of view between each of our eyes - the effect of binocular 
vision which allows us to perceive the world in three dimensions is, as far as the 
construction of pictorial perspective is concerned, negligible.) Any rule generated 
from a single law - in this case that which governs the behaviour of light is bound to 
contain some level of conventionality if it is to be applied broadly and under varying 
circumstances. Hagen argues that linear perspective needs to be modified from its 
mathematical correctness in order to appear natural and convincing to those 
accustomed to the pictorial conventions of Western art (1986). It would therefore not 
be unreasonable to say that there does exist, on some level, an objective reality upon 
which we base the pictorial rules that later incorporate themselves into the collective 
set of rules we call conventions. Without recourse to such a given reality, there could 
necessarily be no concept such as naturalism, which is predicated on the ability of the 












other viewers regarding the identity of the represented things; a consensus not entirely 
dependent on habituation to learnt cultural conventions of depiction. 
The answer as to whether or not perspective provides proof of the limits of 
pictorial relativism is both yes and no, yet perhaps the question is less important than 
it seems. The important question for the naturalistic painter is not whether perspective 
affords an objective rendering of the world, but how it is that perspective is actually 
deployed in pictures; for precise Renaissance perspectival constructions aside, how 
often is pictorial space really constructed according to the rigid rules of linear 
perspective? Thus the answer to the question of how it is that we can recognise items 
upon a marked surface, and what it is about my picture of Table Mountain which 
makes it a picture of Table Mountain and nothing else, whilst partially answered, 
remains essentially elusive. 
Our ability to recognise objects upon a painted surface undoubtedly relies in 
part on all the explanations offered above, and owes much to a certain level of 
habituation on the part of the viewer to particular modes of representation. But these 
triggers would seem to operate on an automatic and passive level, in other words, we 
do not perceive painted things through a conscious referencing of Western perspective 
or one's particular cultural conventions of representation for instance, but through a 
tacit knowledge of the rules and conventions governing pictorial depiction. Yet might 
there not, in the very perception of likeness in a picture, operate a certain level of 
complicity on the part of the viewer; a complicity suggested by Coleridge'S "willing 
suspension of disbelief" (Gombrich 1973: 197)? Having correctly recognised the 
represented thing through the passive referencing of accumulated knowledge and 













through the active participation in a game something like the make-believe view of 
naturalism. 
Illusion 
Common to the various attempts at a definitive account for the workings of 
naturalism explored above, is their denial of what Gombrich calls paradoxically "the 
reality of the illusion" in front of a painting (1973: 194). Let us return to the 'poodle 
on the sofa' example, in which, as Black argued, it is as if, looking through the picture 
frame, one actually saw this scene; and the objections to this view which include that 
which states that the .inevitable distortions present within the image brushmarks for 
instance preclude us mistaking the picture for anything else. Common to these 
opponents of illusion, who include Goodman and Wollheim, is a distinctly Platonic 
distrust of the eyes and the echo of Goethe, who dismissed all talk of the deception of 
the eye as "sparrow aesthetics,,15 (Blinder 1986: 1). Richard Wollheim notes: 
As the eye passes over the picture, across the frame, to the wall on which it is 
placed, it cannot but become aware, however cunning the painting may be, of 
a discrepancy or discontinuity which is fatal to the illusion. (1963: 25) 
Goodman's use of the term 'mistaking' in the statement "seeing a picture as a 
picture precludes mistaking it for anything else" points clearly to the erroneous 
assumption on the part of such writers that illusion consists in the mistaking of a 
picture for the real world; and if this were indeed the case, there would be little more 
to say on the matter. But awareness of the means, or medium, and of the 
15 Goethe's use of the term "sparrow aesthetics" refers to the ancient anecdote from Pliny, in which the 












representation are not mutually exclusive; I believe it can be reasonably said that there 
exists within us the motivation, however small, to react to a naturalistic picture as to 
the real thing, however overlaid by our critical reason these responses may be. And 
even Plato, for whom these critical faculties were located in the higher reaches of the 
soul, would have had to concede that the dominance of these higher reaches is 
insecure; for reason reacts more slowly than our automatic responses (Gombrich 
1973), which includes us reacting to a picture as if it were real; and any argument 
predicated on the assumption that the viewer actively seeks to undermine the effect of 
illusion has forgotten the viewer's 'willing suspension of disbelief, without which we 
might see nothing but the materials of which the picture were made. The effect of 
illusion then depends both on our automatic, instinctual responses and the complicity 
of our higher faculties of reason and judgment, and it is to the discrepancy between 
the responses of these "various reaches of the soul" (Gombrich 1973: 199) that a 
discussion of illusion must tum. (A comprehensive examination of the complex and 
contentious subject of illusion is beyond the scope of this paper; a brief overview of a 
few of the most relevant points will suffice for the purposes of this discussion.)16 
The lowest level of response, occurring within what Plato referred to as the 
vegetative soul (ibid), involves the automatic reaction of an organism in this case 
humans to specific stimuli; a response which relies on there being a limit to 
perceptual relativism. As we noted Gombrich stating earlier: "What looks like a leaf 
to modem humans must also have looked like a leaf to predators in distant geological 
epochs" (1973: 201). 
16 In addition to the texts referenced in this paper, explicit and thorough investigations into the 
problems of illusion - both artistic and scientific - are to be found the in C. Blakemore's The Baffled 












A second level of response would include our habituation to culturally specific 
conventions of representation, however at variance with real appearance they may be. 
lt is this response which causes the viewer to say that the painted thing, a hand for 
example, looks like a real hand, even though real hands do not really look at all like 
the painted one. 
There is a theory regarding the psychology of the mind which relates its 
capacity for perceiving illusion with the search for those satisfactions which life often 
denies us (Gregory 1973). Freudian psychology describes our psychic life in terms of 
a conflict between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, the first of which 
rules our lower soul, the latter the higher soul. The pleasures of illusion were believed 
by Freud to be bought at the expense of reality (Gombrich 1973). Gestalt 
psychologists have investigated the phenomenon of 'closure', the tendency to ignore 
the gap in a circle exposed to the view for a moment (Gregory 1973: 71), a useful 
ability when looking at a pictures, for of course they rarely provide the viewer with 
anything approaching the informational load of a real scene. 
The important point to make in this discussion, despite its inability to address 
more fully the problems of illusion, is that illusions cannot be equated with delusions 
or mistaken beliefs. Even if we grant that Plato was correct in his assessment that 
artistic illusion exploits our uncritical and instinctual reactions, it is precisely because 
we are "less concerned with what is than with what might be", that we find it easy to 
enter into the illusion of a painting (Gregory 1973: 55). Because artistic illusion 
affects us in any case, we allow ourselves to be further aroused by it; a situation 
summed up by the Italian idiom Non evera, rna ci credo (It is not true, but I believe 
it)(ibid). This maxim brings the discussion to the great riddle of naturalistic painting, a 

















It is sufficient that images resemble their objects in some few respects (i.e., in 
respect of extension, shape and size); and often, indeed, their perfection 
depends on their not resembling them as much as they might have done ... and 
thus it comes about that often, precisely in order to be more perfect in their 
quality as images, i.e., the better to represent an object, they ought not to 
resemble it. (Descartes, La Dioptrique) 
With this statement, Descartes has summed up the entire mystery of 
naturalistic painting: the fact that pictures don't ever look very much like the thing 
they are depicting. Even taking into account the roles of denotation, habituation to 
standard conventions of representation, pictorial relativism and illusion, as every 
student of painting learns, the visual language used to bring about in the viewer that 
moment of recognition owes little to the actual appearance of that objective world to 
which we have limited access. 
Despite the inability of this paper to examine more fully at this time the 
concept of illusion, the fact is that we still don't fully understand how it works, for the 
simple reason that we don't yet fully understand the workings of perception, 
physiologically or psychologically. Erasmus' claim that "to destroy illusion is to ruin 
the whole play", adding: "What else is the whole of life but a sort of play?" (Penrose 
1973: 245), points to the complicity of the viewer in a game of make-believe, and 
encourages us to suppose that "we not only cherish at least occasionally this equivocal 














An Inherited Language 
In order that we not lose sight of our original question - how is it that we 
recognise items on a marked surface - we need to ask whether these ideas help the 
painter at all? For whilst they indeed form part of the broader concerns of naturalistic 
painting, they remain approximations or rules of thumb; they do not address the issues 
involved in the actual production of naturalistic pictures; and the sense in which a 
naturalistic picture 'looks like' its subject still resists analysis. 
The difficulty, I believe, is that whilst one acknowledges that a particular 
theory is not obliged to describe every aspect of the set of objects it purports to 
explain, that which is explained is usually something other than what we see and look 
for and wish to describe in pictures. As I stated at the outset of this essay, I do not 
wish to deny the explanatory power of any theories, but I do believe that everyone 
stops short of coming to terms with what happens in individual pictures (I emphasise 
'individual' because too often theories are founded on a few generic examples which 
are required to stand on behalf of the thousands of pictures which may also display the 
same characteristics as those few examples. Whilst it would, of course, be impossible 
for a theory to speak about every picture, this does limit the scope of what theory can 
tell us about pictures on an individual level and with regard to specific 
characteristics). Elkins believes that this inability to deal with individual pictures 
results in theories: "cutting themselves free from any strong connection to what they 
putatively describe" (Elkins 1999: 69), Unless aesthetic and visual theory devotes 















A search then, for a practical definition of naturalism needs to look to art 
historical practices to provide an applicable account of the way it actually works when 
expressed through the medium of paint. Returning to Gombrich, we may recall that he 
writes: 
I have argued in Art and Illusion that we could not study the history of art if 
every artist had been able to start from scratch and to arrive at an independent 
method of representing the world around him. Art has a history precisely 
because the methods of constructing an acceptable image have to be 
developed and have to be learnt Innovations and reductions usually come 
gradually and allow us to trace any stylistic innovation to its source. (1976: 
27). 
Both The Heritage ofApelles and Art and Illusion present themselves as part 
of Gombrich's project of describing the slow accumulation of painterly strategies that 
constitutes Western art. He returns to the example of the highlight, or splendor, in 
order to illustrate this process and attributes its discovery to the Greek painter Apelles, 
the subject of Pliny's anecdote. This story has attracted so much attention in the two 
thousand years since it was written that it has almost disappeared beneath its 
commentaries. The Rembrandt scholar Hans Vande Waal lists in his essay "The linea 
summae tenutatis of Apelles; Pliny's Phrase and its Interpreters" (Elkins 1998: notes 
to pg. 18-25), the thirty major commentaries dating from the Renaissance to the 
twentieth century and each proposes a different way of imagining how the panel 
featured in the story may possibly have looked. Whilst these commentaries remain 
conjecture, they provide a wealth of debate around the nature of marks and surfaces. 
Strangely, most of the commentators considered it inconceivable that any painter 
















consequently imagined the lines to be figures, parts of figures or objects - it is only 
Van de Waal, and Gombrich in his thirty-first commentary, who believed that the 
contest was purely about manual skill. "All subsequent readers who have felt it 
necessary to add some further explanation have done so in part under the un-Greek 
assumption that there must be more to the comparison and judgment of painting than 
manual skill" (Elkins 1998: 38). Gombrich interprets the story in the following way: 
If the prepared panel in Protogenes' studio was grounded with the first colour, 
say blue, Apelles could have drawn his exquisite line with a second, say 
brown. Protogenes, superimposing a thinner line with another colour, might 
have used a third, say ochre, to produce the effect of illumination; the third 
coloured line, with which Apelles "cut the lines, leaving no further place for 
more subtlety", would have been done with the fourth pigment, the trumping 
line of gleaming white. (1976: 15-16). 
Elkins points out a number of problems with this interpretation, not least of 
which the assumptions Gombrich has made regarding the colours used and the 
thinness or thickness of the initial lines. After all, if Apelles had intended to make a 
statement about his ability to master splendor, why not paint the initial line in relief, 
complete with umbra l7 and splendor? For the purposes of this discussion however, I 
am making use of Gombrich's interpretation as it concerns itself with the very subject 
I am investigating. 
In Gombrich's view, Apelles's accomplishment forms part of a larger class of 
painters' methods that together comprise the repertoire we now possess for 
17 Umbra, from the Latin meaning 'shadow', is used, when talking about drawings or paintings, to 
denote that area of dark tone which represents the most deeply shaded side of a figure, object or space. 
Ordinarily it is complemented by an area denoting the light side, or lumen, (in academic drawing 
convention of the nineteenth century, papers were usually toned to a middle value which, when left 












naturalistic representation. The general hypothesis proposes the sensible idea that 
artists draw on one another's methods, that naturalism is a collective effort, and that it 
takes time to find acceptable pictorial equivalents for natural objects. I have already 
sketched the history and development of the splendor through art history; Gombrich 
asks only that we see the various incarnations of the highlight as aspects of a single 
phenomenon invented by Apelles. Nor does it entirely matter what the splendor is: 
Gombrich calls it an "invention", a "visual idiom", a set of related schemata that 
"betray their Western origin", and a "language of light and lustre" (Gombrich 1976: 
9-15). It could even be called a trade secret, a trick, an epochal discovery, or an 
incommunicable knack, yet, no matter how it is named or how we may choose to tell 
its history, writes Gombrich, the splendor has two essential properties without which 
it ceases to be a way of accounting for naturalism: it creates a history of 
"simplifications" and "manifold observations" based on a single phenomenon; and 
that phenomenon is an "instance" of the gradual accumulation that constitutes 
naturalism (ibid). 
The difficulty with this assumption that splendor can be understood as a class 
of innovations gradually accumulated which together comprise a reasonable way of 
understanding naturalism, is that it more properly belongs to a small class of 
nameable "tricks' which do not bear enough relation to naturalistic pictures to count as 
an explanation of them (Elkins 1998). If naturalism is indeed an effect brought about 
through the collective application of individual 'tricks', as Gombrich seems to 
believe, then it would follow that they could be identified, catalogued and applied 
equally well by all painters alike who wish to naturalistically render their world. 
Elkins "entertains the fiction" (1998: 55-58) that such a list could indeed be 
















adds to that continuous colour, tonal gradients and aerial perspective; moves onto the 
notion of the "incompleteness of figure, cutting of frames, parallax, occlusion, and 
competing outlines" (ibid). To this could be added Gombrich's "etc. principle" which 
holds that illusion is served by objects, such as telephone poles, which appear to go on 
into infinity even though only a dozen or so may be drawn. Elkins continues his list 
with "the thick wrinkly skin Rembrandt painted"; "Constable's jagged shorthand 
brushstrokes"; the discovery of refractions and reflections in water, usually attributed 
to Konrad Witz, although anticipated by Masaccio; Georges de la Tour's study of the 
vortices of candle smoke; Jan van Eyck's brilliant oil technique; Titian's glazes; and 
Gerard Ter Borch's satin (ibid). As Elkins points out, it is clearly impossible to 
continue to compile such a list for it would necessitate the inclusion of one 'trick' for 
every picture or artist and would thus trail off into the arcana and obscurities of artists 
and pictures whose existence has been all but forgotten. Such a list would also present 
a rather jumbled and confused collection: a collection incondusive to the predication 
of a coherent theory of naturalism. It is also not clear which 'tricks' are based on a 
single discovery or technique, and which are composites, for instance, Elkins suggests 
that Rembrandt's noses, Ruoppo}o's fish, and Ter Borch's satins are subsets of the 
original ApeUean splendor (ibid). And finally, since some of these 'tricks' appear to 
be the end products of earlier developments rather than useful inventions, it becomes 
difficult to judge which ones could reasonably be included in a list of illusionistic 
tools. As every painter is only too aware, the fact that certain painters have come to be 
identified with the mastery of certain painted things - Turner's atmosphere for 
example - argues that these strategies are not transmissible; many have and will 













(From my own experience as a student of painting, I have discovered, for 
instance, that raw umber and dioxanine purple combine to effectively create the 
illusion of recession underneath a painted chin, yet it certainly does not constitute a 
rule for such depiction, and thus does not describe the workings of naturalism in a 
useful way.) 
If the elements of naturalism cannot be defined in any way that may prove 
useful to the painter, and if those 'tricks' which bear names do not amount to a 
description of it, then naturalism has evaded the theory. It is impossible to found any 
adequate theory of naturalism upon these individual discoveries; they in themselves 
do not make sense of enough of naturalistic painting to enable us to claim that we can 
describe pictorial naturalism (Elkins 1998). Of course that is not to deny that when 
actually looking at a picture one may perceive a context in which it would make sense 
to say that a particular effect of naturalism has arisen out of the use of such a series of 
'tricks'. As one still grappling with some of the fundamental issues of painting, I have 
on many occasions deliberately appropriated the 'tricks' and strategies of other 
painters in order to better serve my picture. What prevents me from feeling like a 
cheat is the certainty that whilst naturalism may superficially appear as the sum of 
strategies, this sum in fact accounts for only a very small percentage of that which 
happens in naturalistic pictures. 
If, leaving behind the specific example of the splendor, we accept Gombrich' s 
general hypothesis that naturalism is a collective effort, and that within a context of 
continuity, artists draw on one another's methods in order to arrive at acceptable 
pictorial equivalents for natural objects, where does that leave the artist in respect of 












Precedence and Originality 
Weaker talents idealise; figures of capable imagination appropriate for 
themselves. But nothing is got for nothing, and self-appropriation involves 
the immense anxiety of indebtedness, for what strong maker desires the 
realisation that he has failed to create himself? (Harold Bloom 1973 :5) 
The theme of originality was a constant within modernist theory; the avante­
garde artist claimed and valued above all, originality as his right (Krauss 1985). R. 
Adam argues that the origin of this attitude lies to a significant extent in the twentieth-
century projection of the nineteenth-century idea of the avante-garde artist, in other 
words, the fact that much art, later regarded as great, had not found immediate 
appreciation with the general public, led to the illogical deduction that in order to be 
great, art had to be unacceptable to the general public (Adam 1988), a view which 
enabled and still enables artists to engage with a continuous search for novelty. 
Contemporary artistic practice, often proclaiming the paramount importance of 
originality and enthusiastically praising those works which employ innovatory 
techniques, new stylistic tricks, or newness of form or medium, often appears to value 
this novelty above all else; "a novelty that will surprise and astonish the common man 
by overturning all those things to which he had become accustomed" (Adam 1988: 
18). Yet what does it actually mean to say that an artist or artwork is truly original?18 
To the painter whose methods of naturalistically representing the world are largely 
determined by his particular cultural milieu, and whose methods for constructing such 
18 By the term 'originality' I am referring to notions of invention which differs qualitatively from 
anything existing previously, and am ignoring other meanings: e.g.,when 'original' means genuine or 
prototype. I am not concerned with forgeries, nor with the much discussed questions regarding copies 











Images are learnt from the vast store of rules and strategies which comprise the 
tradition, is the question even relevant? 
In an attempt to answer ultimate questions of origin, originality and 
precedence, Plato imagined a creator he called the prime mover, who gave form to 
matter, thus instituting motion, time and history. Saint Augustine provided a more 
concise account, with an "immaterial Judeo-Christian God" creating everything from 
nothing (Shiff 1996: 103). For the historian, history cannot proceed without time, and 
thus we narrate history with the assumption that it once had a beginning (ibid). 
Originality implies a coming or doing first, a lack of precedent; therefore it cannot be 
divorced from considerations of chronology and historical sequence (ibid). 
Investigating the concept of originality thus reveals three distinct attitudes: a classical, 
modem and postmodern variant. 
The classical position is founded on the principles of imitation - a concept 
related to the active engagement of an artist with tradition, and which describes the 
relationship of an artist to the antecedents whose work figured in his development (we 
will return to the concept of imitation later) - and invention: the creation of effective 
combinations derived from multiple sources which serves to enrich the standard 
imagery of a particular time. Through this process of artist emulating and re-creating 
artist results an expression of Western culture as a set of collective, anonymous values 
(Shiff 1998). The principle of classical originality thus has little to do with one's 
position in a sequence of artists, but depends on how one participates in the 
transmission of a culture's primary values. Priority becomes a matter of rediscovering 
first principles, and thus classical artists work not to innovate but to "preserve 
















The Romantics, claiming originality as their own and concelvmg of 
themselves as the first true moderns, regarded classicism suspiciously because of its 
normalising values and collective identity; and as the bearer of order and hierarchy, 
classicism regularised and restrained, an impediment to the emphasis on change and 
diversity, personalised and expressive form espoused by the Romantics (Jauss 1988). 
Dismissing the artistic practices of the Renaissance and classical revivals as 
'academic', nineteenth-century critics advised artists to leave their studios and "find 
their model in the landscapes they found themselves in" (Shiff 1998: 410). The 
'natural' order of nature, observed and immediately represented, would free them 
from the influence of the artificial existing culture and its accepted modes of 
representation. 19 
This cult of originality, obsessed with tracing origins and the concept of 
'genius' central to the discourse of modern art - was challenged by postmodern 
artists and theoreticians, who systematically subverted and discredited modernist 
values, including the notion of originality (particularly as understood as the creation 
of new forms) (Sartwell 1998) by denying the very possibility of origin through 
strategies such as appropriation. 
Value and Originality 
It is clear, when speaking generally about originality, that we use the term in 
two apparently contradictory ways: as a concept related to excellence, or as one 
related to innovativeness or newness. When ascribing to pictures the attribute of 
19 An alternative to the modernist claim on the natural and thus originality, stated that when classicists 
turned to ancient art as a model, this was in fact to also work from nature because the ancients, as the 
first artists and thus having no model to follow, used nature directly, capturing its truth for the first 
time. Thus nature's originality could be adequately communicated to the modems through these ancient 












originality we usually fail to make this distinction; our habituation to the insistence of 
originality as a significant merit, has confused the notions of value and newness or 
novelty - and made each a function of the other. Yet as Immanuel Kant said "there 
may also be original nonsense" (Kant Critique ofJudgement Section I, Book II). 
If we define originality as something uncopied, unplagiarised and qualitatively 
different from anything existing previously, it is clear that the term could be used both 
non-evaluatively and evaluatively. In other words, one could speak of the originality 
of an otherwise valueless thing; as F.N. Sibley writes: "Inventions of worthless 
ingenuity and originality abound; the Patent Office is full of them"(Sibley 1985: ] 70). 
The attribute of originality does not necessarily confer merit by virtue of its being 
original; anyone could paint a picture (or for that matter, write a poem or compose a 
piece of music) that fulfils the criteria for originality, and thus in all relevant respects 
be different from any other existing picture, but in point of artistic value be worthless. 
There is certainly no illogic or absurdity embodied in the declaration: "It is original, 
but utterly without value" (ibid). 
Equally clearly however, we can use 'original' in an evaluative way; and in 
indeed this is the way in which we have become accustomed to using it, for when 
speaking of the originality of the work of a particular person, we are apt to 
automatically assume and attribute merit. Thus in using 'originality' evaluatively, we 
now mean uncopied, unplagiarised, qualitatively different "and of some value" 
(Sibley 1985: 171), and in this way would not refer to a work as original if it was 
without merit.20 
20 The contrast between the two uses of the term 'originality' has been drawn very sharply, and 
excludes degrees of greater or lesser originality. In describing works with regard to their originality, 
one is likely to qualify one's assessment, and works may be thus somewhat original, rather unoriginal, 













From this familiar evaluative use of 'original' it is often erroneously 
extrapolated that works which are both extremely innovative and possess aesthetic 
merit must necessarily have great rather than slight merit, or that greater originality 
implies greater merit. When 'originality' stresses only the extremely different or 
innovative, then the concept has no value but the most trivial beyond the excitement 
of novelty for novelty's sake.21 It is also worthwhile to note that extremely innovative 
and original work can be aesthetically neutral; that is, some innovations in style, 
technique and medium, by the very limits they impose, "open up and make possible 
little of aesthetic significance" (Sibley 1985: 174). 
Yet, as misplaced as praise for works merely employing innovatory techniques 
and novelties of form or medium without aesthetic value may be, it would be equally 
wrong to decry any stylistic or technical innovation purely on the grounds of their 
departure from the accepted oeuvre, for without any first stumbling efforts, however 
successful or not, progress is impossible. Sibley argues one instance for the necessity 
of originality for the creation of value in the following way: "Any really different 
aesthetic value, however small, outweighs, in context, any aesthetic value, however 
great, that resembles too closely those existing already; only new sorts of values 
genuinely extend our aesthetic store" (Sibley 1985: 180); and therefore the most 
valuable work is that which will add any shred of significantly different aesthetic 
experience. That is not to say however, that amongst all works, those with any new 
value merit the highest praise, but rather we should bear in mind that "the greatest 
artists as well as the failures have ventured among untrodden ways" (ibid). 
A tentative definition of originality, and one in which the contradictory 
positions regarding the determination of value are reconciled could thus state: 
21 'Novel' and 'original' are sometimes used interchangeably; but 'novel' more often implies the trivial, 












"Originality is the discovery of new and valuable truth" (Sibley 1985: 182). The 
question particularly for the practitioner - immediately arising out of this definition 
is how to arrive at this 'new and valuable truth', stranded as he is somewhere between 
tradition and innovation. 
Paul Crowther, in considering what the general conditions of creativity might 
be, proposes that originality is to be found between a refinement of traditions and 
innovation (1991). When a work, Crowther argues, embodies new features which 
enable it to fulfill its definitive function within a tradition and canon of excellence ­
more efficiently than other such works, or which extends its functional scope, but 
without radically transforming the way in which such works of that sort are 
henceforth made, it counts as a refinement of the rules and traditions of production 
(ibid). Refinements of this kind could be achieved by following established patterns of 
use, Crowther continues, but are sometimes due to a "chance idea, lateral thinking, a 
quirk" (ibid); and it is on these occasions, when the rules which govern production are 
refined on the basis of subjective creative insights, that we may speak of originality 
(1991: 302-4). Innovation occurs when a work's success is due to its "breaking with 
existing rules of production in a way that makes new sets of rules possible" (ibid). 
Originality consists therefore in a refinement or innovation which cannot be achieved 
simply through the repetition of existing ideas, and the original work is one which, in 
its particular configuration, moves beyond customary levels of accomplishment. 
According to Crowther's criteria for originality, the determination of a work's 
level of originality could be determined by the inter-relations of three elements: 
Firstly, the work's "particular created formal configuration"; secondly, "its function 
within the artist's oeuvre"; and thirdly, "the relation of the two preceding elements to 
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Two implications are immediately suggested by this position. The first, as a 
logical extension of the notion of a subjectively determined originality - that is, 
success due to creative inspiration - suggests that in ascribing originality to a work, 
we are not simply saying that it is the product of a creative individual who extended 
the rules of production, but rather, that it is necessarily the product of just the 
individual who produced it (ibid). If originality is a function of the relation between 
all the elements within an imaginative construct, then every choice which informs the 
creation of this order is the expression of a unique personal history (ibid). This 
concept of artistic originality thus presupposes the existence of just that individual 
who is responsible for its achievement. 
The second implication arising from Crowther's particular definition of 
originality, is that which closely relates the concept to that of artistic excellence. Like 
Sibley, he argues that originality is not a sufficient condition of excellence, but 
nonetheless, a necessary one; for a work which simply reiterated well-established 
rules and traditions of production, we would at best describe it as accomplished, but in 
order to merit the term 'excellence' "we would expect that work to be original in a 
way which clarified and deepened experience" (Crowther 1991: 307). 
(Both Sibley a d Crowther appear to speak about artistic originality in general 
terms and do not make the distinction between originality of content and originality of 
form; presumably they imply both in their discussions. Others have made the 
distinction, however, and David Goldblatt argues that artists who repeat the 
aesthetically significant features of their earlier works are essentially self-plagiarisers 
(Goldblatt 1984). Central to his argument is the assumption that what is aesthetically 
significant in a work of art is its style, and claims: "Style plays a role in artworld 












innovation alone describes artistic originality. Selma Kraft by contrast, argues that 
artistic originality may occur with or without stylistic change, but that change in 
content is necessary (Kraft 1986). "The style of a work of art is its form; the meaning 
is its content. Since "style" means the manner of expressing something and not what 
is expressed in that way, the narrow focus on this element ignores the possibility of 
the aesthetic significance of meaning, or content" (ibid). For the purposes of this 
discussion around the general conditions of originality, however, such distinctions are 
beside the point.) 
The concept of originality is an insecure one, continually shifting and elusive; 
and answers to the question of originality vary according to the social situation with 
which they are identified. Shiff argues that "originality is subject to the same irony 
that characterises other cultural constructs: because different social and political 
systems prevail in different eras, any particular cultural value, such as originality, 
appears to lack its own essence or fixed centre, having instead an irregular history" 
(Shiff 1998: 409). So what once might seemed necessary, is revealed to have been a 
fashion associated with a particular time and location, rather than an innate, absolute 
tendency. As well as asking what might be the moment of origin for a particular 
practice or tradition, we could ask what might be the originating conditions or 
motivation for any given sense of originality (ibid). It is clear that the concept of 
originality becomes a matter of what people at a given time believe, why they believe 















Between Tradition and History 
For the artist, the works of the past always influence him, whether or not 
he cares to admit it. There are two ways in which we may know this past: 
tradition and history; and whilst a distinction is often not made between them, 
they are different. John E. Hancock describes the fundamental difference between 
tradition and history as the respective "singularity and plurality of mental models, 
the closed and the open range of past-rooted possibility for creative action" (1986: 
65). In other words, history is descriptive and tradition is prescriptive. Historical 
knowledge, continues Hancock, presents choices but in its universality precludes 
depth of understanding and conviction about the truth of its application, while 
traditional knowledge of the past attains great depth of understanding but only 
because there is no openness or breadth of choice (1986); a view that echoes 
Greenberg'S belief that creative virtuosity flourishes only within the very bounds 
and restrictions of the vocabulary and canon within which the artist works 
(Greenberg 1988). History is indifferent; tradition is conservative in its true sense: 
it conserves. In addition, it sustains itself by continuing to provide solutions to 
new problems in such a way as to remain plausible and convincing; it is flexible 
enough to absorb change without losing its coherence. Tradition is an engagement 
and dialogue with the past that is invaluable for the creation of new and valuable 
work that integrates into the tradition. In the words of Lucien Steil: "Tradition is 
history with a project, not history as an undifferentiated description of the past" 

















Invention, strictly speaking, is little more than a new combination of those 
images which have been previously gathered and deposited in the memory; 
nothing can corne of nothing: he who has laid up no materials can produce no 
combinations. A student unacquainted with the attempts of former 
adventurers is always apt to overrate his own abilities; to mistake the most 
trifling excursions for discoveries of moment, and every coast new to him for 
a new- found country. If by chance he passes beyond his usual limits, he 
congratulates his own arrival at those regions which they who have steered a 
better course have long left behind them ... if we were to forbid to make use 
of the advantages which our predecessors afford us, the art would be always 
to begin, and consequently remain always in its infant state; and it is a 
common observation, that no art was ever invented and carried to perfection 
at the same time. I am ...persuaded that by imitation only, variety, and even 
originality of invention, is produced. What is learnt from others becomes 
really our own, sinks deep, and is never forgotten, nay, it is by seizing on this 
clue that we proceed forward, and get further and further in enlarging the 
principles and improving the practice of our art. Study, therefore, the great 
works of the great masters forever. Study ... those masters ... consider them as 
models which to imitate and at the same time as rivals with whom you are to 
contend. 
- Sir Joshua Reynolds Discourse VI 
* 
As social beings, we communicate through inherited and shared languages, be 
they verbal or pictorial; artists employ a language and medium shaped by 
predecessors who have already established its conventions of use. Even contemporary 
aesthetic privileging of the new "necessarily presupposes the old as a horizon of 














There is no colour I could include in or mix upon my palette that has not seen 
service countless times. My brushes apply paint to canvas in the same way as every 
brush ever has. My use of artificial perspective, the modeling of forms, the 
deployment of light and shadow, my use of line, were worked out, and moreover, 
employed more skillfully than I am able, a millennia ago. Yet despite my continual 
reiteration of tradition, the paintings I produce are fundamentally different from those 
another painter would. (Renaissance writers seem undisturbed by the fact that the 
world may be pleasingly and convincingly painted in a great number of ways 
(Summers 1987), no doubt because they thought that the kind of reality with which 
painting dealt could only be painted (and seen) in as many ways as there were 
painters.) 
"Creation means the repetition of the original creation," wrote Mircea Eliade 
III The Sacred and the Profcme (cited in Steil 1988: 9). Echoing this opinion, 
Quatn!mere de Quincy wrote: "the imitative faculty is truly characteristic of Man: it 
features in all his acts, it enters into all his works, it is so much a part of him and him 
alone amongst all creatures, that one could define him through this attribute, naming 
him: the imitative being" (De Quincy 1988: 7). 
The concept of imitation22 was understood in two senses during antiquity and 
the Renaissance: the imitation of nature, and the imitation of preceding artists; the 
latter being of the greatest concern to Renaissance writers influenced by Aristotle's 
sense of imitation as mimesis (Ackerman 2002). It is interesting to note that Leonardo 
Da Vinci was the only Renaissance writer who disapproved of all imitation and wrote: 
22 Closely related to the concept of imitation is that of appropriation; but whilst imitation refers to the 
adoption of the technique, style or manner of working of others in an inventive process serving to 
expand the tradition; appropriation involves the conscious use of pre-existing material- in this case 
images that derives from a source outside the work and that is then presented as one's own (Nelson 
1996: 118). One of the particular targets of Postmodernism's practice of appropriation, is Modernism's 
claim that important artists are original; an attack ultimately unsuccessful because appropriation itself 












"No-one should ever imitate the maniera of another because he will be called a 
nephew and not a child of nature with regard to art. Because things in nature exist in 
such abundance, we need and we ought rather to have recourse to nature than to those 
masters who have learned from her" (cited in Ackerman 2002: 132). 
It is important at this point to distinguish between the acts of imitating and 
copying, a distinction clearly established by Renaissance artists. To copy was to parrot 
the past by using its forms literally and therefore without understanding. The principle 
of imitation allowed the artist to follow the examples of the masters and expand this 
inherited tradition through subtle innovation. Despite the apparent negative attitude of 
Renaissance artists toward copying, it was of course an important part of 
contemporary artistic training, whether within a master's studio or the academy. This 
institutionalised copying was a heuretic exercise, intended to lead the pupil to 
imitation and finally, assimilation. Imitation, argues Steil, is the reconstruction of an 
original, whereas a copy is merely a reproduction of a precedent (Steil 1988). 
Imitation is based on the critical, selective and inventive process of a living tradition 
and addresses both essence and form, whereas a copy is interested only in appearance. 
Ackerman likens the Renaissance fixation with imitation to the modem critic's 
and historian's fixation on what, in the modem era, the concept of imitation merged 
into: that of influence (Ackerman 2002). Whilst both concepts explain the relationship 
of an artist (or writer, architect etc.) to their antecedents whose work figured in his 
development, imitation functioned, in the premodern era, as a principle of creative 
procedure, fostering sustenance and security; whilst influence relates to the modem 
practitioner in an oppressive way, fostering competition and anxiety (ibid). This 














he attributes the abandonment of the principle of imitation to "the post-Enlightenment 
passion for Genius and the Sublime when there came anxiety too" (1973: 27). 
For the master, argues Allan Greenberg, imitation was and still is an 
engagement with tradition itself and an opportunity to expand, redefine, extend or 
illuminate a part of it (1988); and whilst the student was expected to copy the 
canonical masters, the mature artist's use of imitation allowed him, paradoxically, to 
develop an individualised expression. Thus the Renaissance's conception of imitation 
operated forward, as necessary preparation for emulation, as if in competition with 
one's antecedents to achieve the highest level of skill possible; whilst modem 
influence operates backwards in the sense that after a work has been completed, the 
interpretive process works backward from the work to discover which earlier works 
are relevant to the discussion of it (Ackerman 2002). 
Imitation, of course, involves the possibility of failure; and it could be said that 
the fact that the great volume of writing on the subject by artists and writers of the 
Renaissance which - apart from Leonardo - never entertain the possibility of not 
imitating, indicates a presentiment of the failure of the ability of artists to match or to 
surpass their forebears (ibid). In the wake of any exceptional artist or period of artistic 
activity, "the possibility of decline is always on the horizon" (ibid). 
To decry the principle of direct borrowing from, and the desire to formally 
emulate, past tradition, would be to render most of art history as artistically invalid, 
and would remove Roman, Romanesque, Renaissance, Baroque, Neo-Classical, and 
many more artistic epochs, from serious consideration (Adam 1988). Even distinct 
artistic movements tend to have their roots in other, earlier artistic traditions; where 
new traditions overtly emulate the old, such as Neo-Classicism's revival and imitation 












within those movements whose declared aim was a reaction and revolt against a 
previous era, and we can use again the example of Neo-Classicism in its reaction to 
what it perceived as the excesses and extravagance of the Baroque period, the new 
regime nonetheless resembled for the most part the previous in its deployment of the 
formal visual language of art despite differences in content and meaning. Imitation 
thus mediates actively between tradition and reconstruction and functions as the 
means by which norms are both passed from one generation to the next and adjusted 
to present needs. It could be argued that imitation is a necessary precondition for 
artistic progress. Creativity itself depends upon tradition, argues Greenberg (1988), 
for it requires a complex language with a rich history that balances stability and 
flexibility. The creative powers of the mind, he continues, can be fully engaged only 
within such a vast tradition; artistic virtuosity can only flourish and persist because the 
vocabulary of art is a defined set of bounds within which the artist may exercise his 
skill, and imitation is the means by which the artist, in a dialogue with the past, is able 
to access the vast wealth of the artistic tradition (ibid). 
Assimilation 
Imitation culminates in assimilation. To repeat Reynolds, it is what occurs 
when, through a continuous dialogue between the imitated and the imitation, "what is 
learnt from others becomes really our own"( Discourse VI). Successful assimilation is 
what distinguishes the merely competent and unremarkable work from the 
masterpiece; the masterpiece resulting from the "unique integration of tradition with a 












appropriate at this point to bring this discussion to a brief explication of the work 
produced by myself for this degree, around which the ideas explored in this 
dissertation tum. 
My proposition at the commencement of this process was clear: to acquire the 
skills, technique and language of Western naturalistic painting; my intention being to 
put these acquired skills to the task of investigating that enduring riddle of naturalism, 
that is, what we mean when we say that a picture looks like the world. The decision to 
work within a well-worn and well-defined tradition was an intentional one. The 
limitations imposed by the narrow genre of naturalistic figure painting pose 
significant challenges, not least of which being the necessity of achieving a certain 
level of proficiency in the deployment of the medium as dictated by the canon and 
tradition of Western painting, a discipline that recalls Greenberg's comment that 
artistic virtuosity can only flourish because the vocabulary of art is a defined set of 
bounds, and that only within the tradition can the artist fully engage his creative 
powers. 
For the painter, the works of others present themselves as recipes, the 
ingredients of which - composition, line, colour, light - differ only in tenns of quality 
and quantity. In setting up propositions within the tradition, these offer themselves as 
potential answers to the aesthetic questions which arise in one's own work. In a sense 
the painter becomes a scavenger, gathering bits and pieces plundered from the works 
of others. (Curiously, in my own practice of borrowing and imitating, I tend to 
become obsessed only with aspects of other paintings. The particular jagged and 
fleshy white highlights in the work of EI Greco for instance, compel me to try and 
imitate them; yet I cannot deny the sheer crudeness of some of his colour 












denying of course their deserved place within the canon - which invite imitation; 
whilst those works which come as close as a painting can to being perfect certain 
works by Vermeer for instance - I tend to exclude from that repertoire of precedents 
from which I borrow.) 
There are of course varying degrees of borrowing and imitation. A voiding the 
literalness of appropriation, I allowed aspects of those works which, through close 
study, I borrowed from and was influenced by, to assimilate into my working practice 
and thus become part of my own visual language. 
Notes on Process 
My choice of subject matter - the solitary figure in an interior space brings 
with it the possibility that the work may be read within the ambit of various areas of 
discourse which may be suggested by, and ostensibly relate to, my chosen subject, 
such as those concerning the body or feminist theory for example. The motivation for 
choosing my specific subject matter however, arose out of a particular fascination 
with the rendering in paint of flesh and form, a motivation which overarches all other 
possible readings, however relevant they may be. Subject matter is deployed in the 
service of the painting; what is ultimately important is what the subject does in terms 
of the construction of the picture and the possibilities it offers regarding its rendering 
in paint, rather than what it means. 
The body of work falls into two distinct groups. Not wishing merely to 
continue producing works similar to those of my undergraduate study, I was 
determined at the start of the masters program to use the opportunity to learn and 












represent this process of learning and the exploration of the strategies and techniques 
of naturalistic painting. 
These five paintings (Plates I - 5) are concerned with a more obviously optical 
investigation into the actual workings of naturalistic representation. The optical 
information provided by the source material was - allowing for the inevitable liberties 
taken in the making of a picture precisely translated into paintings in which the logic 
of the real world prevails over the internal logic of the painted world. Yet even so, and 
remembering that in fact any painted object more closely resembles any other painted 
object rather than its counterpart in the real world, the very act of applying paint to a 
surface, no matter how closely one attempts to recreate an accurate 'likeness' of the 
represented thing, distances the representation from the represented immeasurably. 
The two bathroom paintings (Plate 4 and 5) evidence this in the disparity between two 
pictures of the same subject in the same space. Both pictures display an equivalent 
level of naturalism, yet investigate two very different ways of seeing and describing 
the same subject. 
The first two works in the series (Plates I and 2) explore various formal 
devices compositional structure, the distribution of light, and the abstract effects of 
colour in different ways. Contrasting perspectivally constructed space with flattened 
space, strongly directional light with ambient and diffuse light, points of heat with 
areas of coolness, I arrived at a greater understanding of how these formal and 
abstract elements operate and describe the world within the picture. The third work 
(Plate 3) combines the lessons learned into a more complex articulation of geometric 
space, lighting, and distribution of colour. Reference to the Northern European 
tradition of the specular highlight is clear in the still-life which occupies the centre of 
the picture. (Although not explicitly apparent, the five works of the first series make 
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use of a large range of visual borrowings and references, derived mainly from the 
Italian and Dutch schools of painting.) This work, which endured many incarnations, 
functioned as a sort of testing ground for newly developed skills, and began to reveal 
the infinite possibilities afforded by the medium of paint for the naturalistic rendering 
of the world. The bathroom paintings (Plates 4 and 5), in their exploration of two 
opposed ways of seeing and representing, are an attempt to arrive both at a 
consolidation of technique and at a point where I could begin to develop a personal 
aesthetic and mode of depiction less reliant on the visual information contained in the 
source material. 
Having considered the successes and shortcomings of these five works, and 
extracting from them a clear and well-defined idea of the direction in which I wanted 
new works to go, the second series of five paintings evidence the development of a 
more idiosyncratic manner of working and aesthetic. 
Whilst the first paintings reflect the process of learning the language and 
technique of naturalism, it is within the second group of five works that I began to 
explore the question of how it is that naturalistic paintings produce an experience 
which is like looking at the real thing. Through the subtle subversion of various 
artistic conventions - perspective, naturalistic colour, and informational load - these 
works seek to interrogate some of the possible answers to the problem explored earlier 
in this dissertation. Integral to these interrogations was the adoption of a limited and 
sombre palette; a palette similar to that of the Spanish school, in particular Velasquez 
and EI Greco. It is difficult to say whether the shift in interest from the Dutch tradition 
to the Spanish was a reflection of the direction in which my aesthetic was already 
developing, or whether my interest in the work of the Spanish school influenced my 















progressively limit the amount of information provided by the paintings; a strategy 
which also included the systematic emptying of the picture space. Whereas earlier 
works, Plate 3 in particular, tended to be crowded by both the figure and the 
environment, the second series is slowly stripped of both objects and the substantiality 
of the figure, a subtractive process reinforced through the restriction of colour. 
Liberties taken with other pictorial conventions are entirely intentional. For example, 
both the figure and the environment of Plate 9 are flattened both through the lack of 
differentiation of colour or tone between the receding plane of the floor and the 
horizontal plane of the wall, and through the flat black clothing of the figure which is 
seated in such a way as to prevent the body from providing any spatial information. 
Another important shift in my work was the conscious effort to apply paint in 
a more economical and painterly manner. This shift was imperative for a number of 
reasons, not least of which was helping me to avoid the laboured appearance of the 
earlier works; an appearance due both to a lack of confidence on my part in the actual 
application of the paint, and in the necessity of numerous repaintings in order to 
achieve the desired result. Remembering the objection to pictorial illusion that 
proposed that the awareness of brushstrokes precludes us from mistaking the picture 
for anything else, this economical and looser manner of painting allowed small areas 
of canvas to remain visible under very thin, scrubbed layers of paint yet did not lessen 
the naturalism of the pictures, and thus allowed me to confirm practically the 
fallaciousness of this argument. 
In tracking the shift between the first and second groups of works, it becomes 
apparent that there is a move away from a generic type of figure painting to a more 
person specific form of portraiture. I do not intend at this point to explore the tradition 















of naturalism. Rather than merely asking what it is that makes the painting a picture of 
a figure, one now has to ask what it is that makes it a picture of a particular person. 
The disparity - in terms of composition, colour, technique and conception ­
between the two groups of works is clear and has been commented on by various 
viewers. I felt that it was important to let these differences stand as evidence of the 
learning process which is an essential part of the masters degree. 
Both this brief discussion of my work and the dissertation as a whole, 
represent only one way of talking about painting in general and my work in particular. 
There are many other, equally relevant ways in which I could speak about both the 
tradition of painting and the work produced for the degree, but as a student whose 
primary concern is the language of paint itself, a discussion of naturalistic painting 
was the most interesting way I could approach the huge subject that is the Western 
tradition. 
Are not our lives too short for that full utterance which through all our 
stammerings is of course our only and abiding intention? 













The task of navigating one's way through the vast and complex history of 
European painting is a fonnidable one. The exploration presented here represents but 
a tiny line of inquiry, a line which is both necessarily exclusive and inconclusive. The 
tradition of painting presents itself as an immense agglomeration of histories, artists, 
styles, and works which, through the continuous processes of creation and imitation, 
preservation and discovery, selection and reiteration, tends to impede any attempt to 
trace a linear path through it. Thus in attempting to trace a particular and specific 
course of investigation through the subject, every change in course necessitates the 
exclusion of any number of alternative and equally relevant ways of talking about it. 
Thus the arguments presented in this dissertation cannot be anything but inconclusive 
as the ideas explored represent only a tiny fraction of the discourse. Yet one suspects 
that even given unlimited space in which t  collect every idea and notion pertaining to 
the practice of naturalistic painting, it would continue to resist analysis. Naturalistic 
pictures create a world of appearances and illusions; and whilst images have a 
material existence, what they represent is something other than an integrative part of 
an empirical reality. Pictures properly belong to another way of knowing, a way of 
knowing only partly definable through conceptual, logical and theoretical tenns. 
Perhaps the problem lies with the language we use to talk about pictures. 
Michael Baxandall wrote: " ... the nature of language means that the description [of a 
picture] is less a representation of seeing the picture, than a representation of thinking 
about having seen the picture." (Baxandall 1985: 67). Language, argues Gombrich, 
developed as a social tool to communicate ordinary experiences, hypotheses about the 












notoriously when we want to convey the elusive states of subjective reactions and 
responses. 
Even if we possessed the perfect tools for describing it however, the difficulty 
with naturalistic pictures lies in the fact that the very notion of it, and the attendant 
issues which inevitably arise within the discussion, even the very concept of painting 
itself, is an inherently unstable one. With every social, political and aesthetic shift 
comes a resultant shift in the attitude, conception, and mode of expressing such 
values; they are not absolute or eternal values and thus the best one can hope to 
achieve is to trace these historical shifts and fluctuations. 
In the end the question remains, what is a painting? Is it, as Elkins asks, the 
physical, framed object, with its entourage of meaning, the gossip about its painter, 
and the letters, reports, reviews and books it inspired? (Elkins 2000: 192). Or is 
painting a verb that describes the movement of paint across a surface? It is to this 
second definition that the painter, who spends his entire life applying paint to 
surfaces, is inextricably drawn. Perhaps talking about paintings in terms of paint is the 
only reliable way we have of describing them, for there is no escaping medium. 
Whilst depicting things naturalistically is a huge preoccupation for some - myself 
included - it is ultimately ancillary to the medium itself. Painting, as way of depicting 
things, is notoriously inefficient and labour intensive, and as a means to create illusion 
does no better than many other media. Thus there must be something about the paint 
itself that keeps drawing artists to it and occupies their imaginations - a preoccupation 
which has allowed painting to reinvent itself within every artistic epoch and to 
maintain its relevance within the larger world of art making. 
I therefore will not attempt to draw conclusions to this line of investigation, 

















the immense size and complexity of the tradition within which one works, one accepts 
that there can be no definitive account of what painting is, or even, for the purposes of 
this investigation, how naturalism works. In the end paint resists analysis and refuses 
definition. 
We shall not cease from exploration 
And the end of all our exploring 
Will be to arrive where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 














PLATES 1 - 10 

THE WORKS ARE ARRANGED IN THE ORDER IN WHICH THEY WERE PAINTED 
















Tom reading a book 
Oil on canvas 
120cm x 90cm 
This work explores the effect of intense directional lighting and the way in which 
light serves both to reveal form and to obliterate it. The clock on the wall makes reference 
to the Dutch tradition of the painted highlight and the depiction of objects through a 
description of their characteristic reactions to light, rather than through tonal modeling. The 
mirror was used a s a device to both concentrate the light source and to reveal those parts of 
the scene which would be otherwise hidden from view. 
This work also constituted an exercise in relating the formal elements of the 
composition to each other: the relation of the bright mirror to the dark painting above it, the 
harsh light of the mirror to the delicate light of the clock, areas of light with areas of 
darkness, and areas of heat with areas of coolness. 
A difficulty I encountered with this painting involved the rendering of the mirror 
and the area of bright light sur ounding it. White paint is often difficult to integrate into a 

























Oil on canvas 
120cm x 90cm 
In contrast to the preceding work, this painting explores the effects of ambient, 
rather than strongly directional, light. The relationship between the figure and the 
environment was of the previous work was inverted so that rather than the body being the 
warmest part of the picture, the body is now the coolest, and is contrasted with the red sheet 
which in tum carries the heat and fleshiness normally found in the body. I wanted the 
figure to appear as though it were sinking into the cool void of the wall behind it. 
During the course of numerous reworkings - in order to resolve problems relating 
to the use of colour and the rendering of the wall - I removed both the pillow against which 
the figure had originally reclined, and a painting which had hung above his head. This was 
the start of a process of subtraction which continued throughout the body of work. 
This work presented a significant problem with regard to the rendering of the head; 
























Tom asleep in his bedroom 
Oil on Canvas 
l20cm x l75cm 
The knowledge gained through the problems of the preceding works was put to the 
task of arranging and resolving a larger, and compositionally more complex painting. 
Resolving it was a challenge in terms of the rendering of form with light, and the spatial 
arrangement of the elements within the picture. This was - with regard to my learning 
process - an ambitious painting, and required many reworkings, even entire repaintings, in 
order to bring it to its present state. During the course of these reworkings, the colour of the 
wall surfaces was shifted - through degrees - from a warm orange to its present cool green­
grey. Overall , the palette was gradually reduced and refined from its initial warm and 
overly colourful state to its present subdued one. 
Reference is made - through the still-life in the center of the picture - to the genre 
of the vanifas still-life: the books, coins and flower are common elements of such paintings. 
In addition to the table and still-life, the composition had originally included a bookcase, 
desk and lamp, all of which were systematically removed as it became clear that they did 
not serve the painting in any useful way. An open door was then introduced in order to 
relieve the somewhat cramped and oppressive atmosphere of the depicted scene. 
An oblique reference was also made to Velasquez's "Las Meninas", which contains 
at its center a small mirr:or around which the spatial paradox of that painting revolves. 
7. , ...... . 
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Tom standing at the bathroom mirror 
Oil on canvas 
120cm x 90cm 
This work afforded me the opportunity to resolve many of the problems previously 
encountered regarding the use of colour and the fall and actions of light. The real subject of 
this painting is the great expanse of the figure's back which occupies most of the space in 
the picture. The difficulty lay in achieving through modulations of colour, rather than 
tone - a convincing rendition of the fleshiness and three-dimensionality of an otherwise 
























Tom sitting on the bath room floor 
Oil on canvas 
120cm x 90cm 
This painting explores a different way of seeing and depicting - in terms of light 
and colour - the same subject in the same space as the previous work. Despite the fact that I 
work primarily from photographic sources, I do not incorporate this aspect of my working 
practice into my paintings. This painting is the only one from this body of work which 
makes reference to its photographic source; and it does this for instance, by retaining the 
peculiar shadow cast behind the figure which was caused by the flash used when taking the 
photograph. Other photographic residues however, 1 did not wish to retain. This caused 
particular difficulty in the perspectival depiction of the floor tiles due to the fact that 
modifying the angles distorted by the lens of the camera caused the perspective of the floor 
to become strangely skewed. Not possessed of a scientific knowledge of perspective, 
correcting this flaw proved extremel  difficult; and I do not make any claims for the 

























Lawrellce stalldillg ill his studio 
Oil on canvas 
175cm x 120cm 
The composition of this work is based on the painting Young Boy With Cal by 
Renoir (Figure 4). There was no particular reason for choosing to imitate the composition 
of this work other than it suited my purpose in terms of what it was I wanted to say about 
the subject of the work, Lawrence. Renoir ' s boy, though turned away, is inviting in his 
coyness, and he inhabits his body with ease. Lawrence is more reserved however, his body 
is less languid , his face partly obscured, and he is not nude. The birds in the mirror can be 
read as a reference to Goethe's 'sparrow aesthetics' in which he derides the practice of 
naturalistic painting. Other visual references are to be found in the red draped cloth, which 
is based on the red drapes Velasquez so often included in his royal portraits; and in the 
palette, which is influenced by EI Greco ' s distinctive use of colour. 
Fig. 4 Renoir Young Boy with Cat Musee d'Orsay, Paris 
83 











This is the first work in which I began to move away from a close description of the 
scene as it actually appeared. By taking the perspective lesson of the previous work (Plate 
5) and distorting it in an intentional depiction of a slightly illogical space (the reflection in 
the mirror would not actually appear in that position), I was examining the way in which 
the internal pictorial logic of a picture differs from that of the real world. 
The first major challenge posed by this work was the articulation of space and 
volume by modeling through shifts in hue, rather than merely shifting a particular colour 
tonally. The second challenge was an unforeseen one. In plotting the figure on the surface 
in the underpainting stages, I realised that because of the vertical length of the figure , an 
inevitable distortion appeared when viewed from the correct hanging height: the legs 
appeared too long and the upper half of the body too short. (The general elongation of the 
figure is drawn from the physical distortions present in the work ofEI Greco. See Figure 5.) 
I therefore had to build a distortion into the actual painting - the legs were shortened and 
the torso lengthened - in order to counteract this effect. This constitutes an actual example 
in which naturalistic pictures work counter to actual experience. 




























Lawrence sitting in front ofhis hammock 
Oil on canvas 
125cm x 100cm 
This painting displays the first convincingly rendered and articulated head and face 
in this body of work. The mirrors found in the previous works are echoed in the reflective 
surface of the floor which, through the uneven fall of light on it, imparts a fractured quality 
to the surface. This fractured surface then becomes a void-like space beneath the feet of the 
figure, which hover disembodied between the void and the darkness of the trousers he is 
wearing. The biggest problem posed by this work was the convincing rendering of the 
broken and reflected light of the floor into the picture surface. As with Tom reading in his 
























Catherine sitting on a chair 
Oil on canvas 
125cm x 100cm 
Both the elongation of the body and the palette of cool greys, brown-greys and 
yellow, are influenced by the works of EI Greco. My intention for this work was to reduce 
the clarity and articulation of the space through the use of similar hues and tones and loose 
brushwork in both the foreground and background planes. In addition, the clothed portion 
of the figure recedes and partly merges into the background in order to allow a visual 
relationship between the lit parts of the figure, the head, hands and feet, to be set up. 
This work demonstrates an increasing economy of brushwork and paint application, 
























Catherine with afox stole 
Oil on canvas 
128cm x 98cm 
Like the previous work, the general elongation and leanness of the figure ­
particularly evident in the hands - is derived from EI Greco. (Figures 6 and 7) 
Fig. 6 EI Greco Saint Andrew and Saint Fig. 7 EI Greco Holy Family with 
Francis (detail) 1590 Museo del Prado, Saint Anne (detail) 1595 Museo del 
Madrid Prado, Madrid 
With this painting I intended to playa game, if you will, with the some of the 
conventions of naturalistic depiction: those of volumetric modeling and perspective. 
Through the clothing of the figure in undifferentiated black, and the drawing of the body up 
into a compact form, volumetric modeling of the body was limited to the extremities and 
the bulk of the figure remained relatively flat. The floor and wall surfaces are not overtly 
differentiated in terms of colour or tone, which ordinarily would be used to create a sense 
of space and depth in a painting. Due to the relative dullness of the palette (despite the red 
underpainting which was allowed to show through) the modeled parts of the figure, and 

















Corky at the open window 
Oil on canvas 
120cm x lOScm 
The work refers explicitly to Bronzino's Portrait ofa Young Man (Figure 8). Once 
again, it was not through a desire to refer in particular to Italian Renaissance painting that I 
made use of the composition, but because, like the previous work Catherine with a fox 
stole, I liked the way the bulk of the black clothing formed a flattened mass in the center of 
the picture. 
Fig. 8 Bronzino Portrait ofa Young Man Metropolitan 
Museum, New York 
Using this device of the black clothing, I allowed the black shirt of the figure to 
recede into the dark background. The window and window handle were added later to 
counterpoint the large ears of the figure, and to set up a relationship between the focal 
points of the hands, head and window handle. 
(Although evident in a number of the paintings which comprise this body of work, 
the problem of surface shine and glare as a result of the particularly high oil content of 
certain dark colours, is most evident in this work. This can only be rectified by the 
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